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ABSTRACT
This research begins by examining four theoretical 
perspectives on interpersonal relationships. After 
reviewing reinforcement theories, cognitive theories, and 
psychoanalytic theories a set of propositions are set 
forth which direct attention to the importance of communi­
cation for the establishment and development of inter­
personal relationships. This function of communication is 
termed relational communication. The study sought to 
develop and validate a coding scheme for measuring rela­
tional interaction by answering the following questions:
(1) What types of relational interaction characterize 
decision-making groups and consciousness-raising groups?;
(2) What, if any, are the differences in relational 
interaction between a decision-making group and a 
consciousness-raising group?' (3) Do patterns of rela­
tional interaction in either a decision-making group or 
a consciousness-raising group change over time; (4) Does 
the interaction produced by dyads in either a decision­
making group or consciousness-raising group differ from 
a group’s total interaction.
The audio-recordings of two decision-making groups 
and two consciousness-raising groups were subjected to a
Markov statistical analysis.
The results of the study suggest the following 
conclusions: (1) Decision-making groups function simi­
larly and are characterized by equivalent symmetry, 
competitive symmetry, initiation cycles, and deference;
(2) Consciousness-raising groups operate as unique inter­
acting systems. While both groups are characterized by 
equivalent symmetry, one consciousness-raising group 
used initiation sequences and the other resorts to rela­
tional deference; (3) Decision-making interaction varies 
over time; (4) Only one of the consciousness-raising group 
had significant change over time; (5) Dyads formed by the 
leader and opinion deviate in decision-making groups 
differ from the total group interaction. Finally, the 
study proposes changes in the coding scheme and recommen­
dations for future research.
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I owe a debt of appreciation to many people. This 
degree culminates years of sound advice, encouragement, 
and skillful tutelage.
My principle intellectual debt is to B. Aubrey Fisher. 
Aubrey's original and exacting mind is responsible for 
anything good about my own scholarship. My often rough 
and unhewn ideas always benefited from a bout with his 
challenging personality. By never confusing the tenacity 
of my arguments with their conceptual worth, Aubrey taught 
me the value of rigorous inquiry. His influence on me, and 
the discipline of communication, have yet to be realized.
I owe special thanks to Mike Burgoon and Mai Sillars. 
These two men provided invaluable advice and encouragement. 
From them I acquired a sense of professionalism and acute 
concern for the field of communication.
Particular acknowledgment goes to Richard Rieke,
Irwin Altman, Janet Kourany, and Dennis Alexander. These 
people were always interesting and helpful.
Finally, my wife Sheri deserves special consideration. 
She is wife, mistress, critic, and supporter. Rarely have





LIST OF TABLES.....................................  ix
CHAPTER
I THE RESEARCH PROBLEM......................  1
Theoretical Perspectives................  3
Statement of Purpose....................  22
II PROCEDURES...................... .. 24





Data Description........................  36
Phasic Analysis ........................  4 5
Dyadic Analysis ......................... 54




A CODING MANUAL ............................. 112
B COMPOSITE MATRICES......................... 119
C MATRICES FOR SIGNIFICANT DYADS IN FIRST
DECISION-MAKING GROUP ..................  124
D MATRICES FOR SIGNIFICANT DYADS IN SECOND
DECISION-MAKING GROUP ..................  131
Page
E HOMOGENEITY MEASURES FOR CONSCIOUSNESS-
RAISING GROUPS..............................137
REFERENCES......................................... ...140




1. Matrix of Relationship Types ..............  30
2. Interacts Inducing Structure in Decision­
Making Groups Compared to First 
Consciousness-Raising Group..............  39
3. Interacts Inducing Structure in Decision­
Making Groups Compared to Second 
Consciousness-Raising Group..............  41
4. Anderson and Goodman Measures for Combined
Decision-Making Groups and Combined 
Consciousness-Raising Groups ............  43
5. Interacts Inducing Structure in Decision­
Making Groups Compared to Combined 
Consciousness-Raising Groups ............  44
6. Results of Anderson and Goodman Measures
for Three Phases of Decision Making. . . .  46
7. Transition Probabilities from Row
Compared to the Composite................  48
8. Transition Probabilities from I- Row
Compared to the Composite................  49
9. Results of Anderson and Goodman Measures
for Four Phases of Decision Making . . . .  50
10. Transition Probabilities from +- Row
Compared to the Composite................  51
11. Transition Probabilities from 4-+ Row
Compared to the Composite................  52
12. Transition Probabilities from Row
Compared to the Composite................  52
13. Transition Probabilities from -> Row
Compared to the Composite................  53
14. Anderson and Goodman Measures for Four
Phases of Consciousness-Raising Group
O n e ..................................... 55
15. Transition Probabilities from ++ Row
Compared to the Composite..............  56
16. Transition Probabilities from +- Row
Compared to the Composite..............  56
17. Transition Probabilities from -* Row
Compared to the Composite..............  57
18. Results of Homogeneity Measures for All
Dyads in First Decision-Making Group. . . 59
19. Results of Homogeneity Measures for All
Dyads in Second Decision-Making Group . . 60
20. Interacts Inducing Structure in Speaker
One Dyads............................... 92
21. Interacts Inducing Structure in Speaker
Two Dyads............................... 99





In 1943 Kurt Lewin argued that "the essence of a 
group is not the similarity or dissimilarity of its 
members, but their interdependence." Fifteen years 
later May Brodbeck (1958, p. 2) suggested that group 
situations were determined by the unique observable 
relationships among a collection of individuals. And 
Cartwright and Zander (1968, p. 46) in their comprehen­
sive work on group dynamics conclude that the significant 
interdependence of individuals is the defining property 
of groups.
The above perspectives on the nature of the small 
group setting have one thing in common. The relationships 
among individuals is the basic element of the concept 
"group." The definitions do not refer to the necessity 
of some organizational type (see McDavid and Harari, 1968), 
a common goal (Mills, 1967), perception (Bales, 1954), 
or the motivation to satisfy some need (Cattell, 1959;
Bass, 1960). Individuals may join groups because they 
are motivated to satisfy a need and this motivation may 
be useful in accounting for the formation of groups. And
it also follows that some organizational structure is 
inevitable and is certainly a consequence of group 
interaction. Moreover, individual members might perceive 
themselves as members of an entity called a group.
Finally, a common goal may be either a reason to join a 
group, a consequence of group interaction, or possibly 
unimportant to the existence of the group. The essential 
point is that none of these dimensions of groups adequately 
defines the nature of a group. A meaningful distinction 
between individual and collective behavior can be made 
only by referring to interdependence or relationships 
among individuals.
A human relationship is essentially a characteristic 
pattern of interlocked behaviors. That is, one person’s 
behavior is dependent upon or influenced by the behavior 
of another, and this dependency is mutual and repetitive. 
If, as Lewin, Brodbeck, and Cartwright and Zander argue, 
the essence of a group lies in member interdependence, 
then the direct observation of member relationships should 
provide fruitful insights into the nature of group func­
tioning. What follows, then, is the development of a 
perspective on the role of verbal behavior in establishing 
human relationships, i.e., relational interaction.
The research questions which guide the proposed 
study are designed to elucidate the nature of relational 
interaction in two group situations, namely, a problem
solving group and a consciousness-raising group. These 
two groups provide diverse settings in order to test the 
sensitivity of a coding scheme designed to measure 
relational interaction. The research questions include: 
What types of relational interaction characterize a 
decision-making group? What types of relational inter­
action characterize a consciousness-raising group? What, 
if any, are the differences in relational interaction 
between a decision-making group and a consciousness- 
raising group. Do the patterns of relational interaction 
in either a decision-making group or a consciousness- 
raising group change over time? What is the relation 
between each member of the group and every other member? 
How do the individual dyadic relationships differ from 
the total group interaction?
Theoretical Perspectives 
The focus of this research is on the nature and 
development of member relationships in group settings.
An examination of the previous research dealing with 
interpersonal relations reveals four discernible theoret­
ical perspectives: reinforcement theories, cognitive 
theories, psychoanalytic theories, and system theory.
Each theory is outlined with respect to underlying 
assumptions, the variables appropriate for study, and 
the status of the research.
Reinforcement Theory
The claim that reinforcement theories have generated 
more research and met with more success than any other 
theoretical framework has become a truism. While a 
comprehensive view of reinforcement theory is certainly 
impossible (see Hall, 1966; and Kimble, 1967), the 
intent of this section is to expose basic principles 
and relate these principles to the work in interpersonal 
relations which fall under the rubric of a reinforcement 
orientation.
The fundamental assumption of the reinforcement 
orientation is that humans seek to extract rewards from 
their environment and avoid punishment. The reinforcement 
orientation posits that people enter a relationship because 
the relationship is rewarding in some way. Couched in the 
language of learning theory, one interactant elicits a 
stimulus which occasions a change in the behavior of a 
second interactant and the second person responds in 
accord with the stimulus. If the response of the second 
interactant is reinforced, it will increase in both 
frequency and strength. Interpersonal relationships, 
according to the reinforcement orientation, may be con­
sidered a series of stimulus-response sequences which are 
rewarding to the individuals involved.
The literature born out of the reinforcement paradigm 
is ample. However, a brief explication of two bodies of
research generated by the reinforcement perspective 
should demonstrate the perspective’s major contribution. 
The two lines of research include Homans’ theory of 
elementary social behavior, and Thibaut and Kelley's 
theory of interaction outcomes.
Homans' research on interpersonal behavior has 
undergone a series of criticisms and adjustments (see 
Homans, 1950; Riecken and Homans, 1954; and Homans, 1961); 
yet the basic premise remains unchanged. Homans maintains 
that interpersonal relations can be explained by reference 
to the psychological exchange of rewards (positive rein­
forcement) and costs (negative reinforcement). He argues 
that people interact when they exchange activities and 
sentiments. If interaction has been rewarded in the past 
under some stimulus situation, then future occurrences 
of that stimulus situation should elicit the same be­
havior.
Though Homans has articulated a fairly elegant 
explanatory system for human interaction, his approach 
has generated very little research. One reason offered 
by Shaw and Costanzo (1970, p. 81) is the vagueness of 
some of the terms, particularly the term "value." Many 
of Homans' terms cannot be operationalized and, while 
they are conceptually interesting, they are heuristically 
static. The term "sentiments," for example, needs to be 
elaborated. Numerous types of sentiments and situational
factors can mediate their effects. Therefore, if the 
exchange of sentiments is reinforcing, some elaboration 
of the qualitatively different types of sentiments is 
necessary. However, given the obscurity of the concepts 
no such elaboration exists. A potentially more accurate 
reason for the failure of Homans’ theory to generate 
research is probably because the theory has been over­
shadowed by the ideologically similar and more popular 
propositions of Thibaut and Kelley.
Like Homans, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) attempt to 
explain how two or more people maintain a dependence on 
one another by exchanging rewards and costs. However, 
they go farther than Homans .by elucidating a technique 
for establishing relationships, determining rewards and 
costs, and evaluating a relationship.
Participants in a relationship decide whether to 
maintain their relationship by matching rewards and costs 
to a comparison level (CL) or standard to judge the value 
of the relationship. Rewards and costs are derived from 
outside the relationship (exogenous), or emanate directly 
from the unique interaction between the individuals 
(endogenous). A minimum positive level (rewards greater 
than costs) must exist for continued attraction and 
affiliation.
Thibaut and Kelley's explanation of interpersonal 
relationships has generated a voluminous body of research.
The research question which has received the brunt of 
empirical attention concerns the fundamental issues of 
why people interact at all or how interpersonal attrac­
tion helps determine relationship formation and develop­
ment. Lott and Lott (1961) report that children who were 
rewarded transfer these rewards to future interaction.
Early studies by Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) 
and Sommer (1959) clearly reveal the role of proximity 
in determining interpersonal relationships. Schachter 
(1959) , followed by Darley and Aronson (1966) , demonstrated 
that the presence of others was particularly rewarding 
when an individual was in a state of anxiety. In addition 
to lowering anxiety, the rewarding presence of others 
lessens stress (Back and Bogdonoff, 1964) and increases 
self-esteem (Dittes, 1959).
A central theme from the reinforcement paradigm holds 
that if persons A and B like one another, then they are 
reciprocally rewarding each other and thereby inter­
personally attracted (see Homans, 1961; Dulany, 1961).
Yet this conclusion is modified by the results of the 
Deutsch and Solomon (1959) study. Deutsch and Solomon 
found that when one person in a relationship had recently 
experienced failure, the rewarding behavior of another 
did nothing to increase attractiveness. Dickoff (1961) 
supports this incongruity exception to reciprocity-of- 
liking and concludes that the extent to which one person’s
perception of self-esteem is congruent with another's 
is an important factor in reciprocity-of-liking.
The literature on social penetration (Altman and 
Taylor, 1973) draws heavily from exchange theories. An 
earlier work by Frankfurt (1965) used the varying levels 
of interactant self-disclosure to conclude that inter­
personal relations developed toward intimacy over time 
as a function of reward-cost ratios. Altman and Taylor 
(1965) and Taylor (1968) support the developmental process 
of interpersonal relations and contend that the penetra­
tion profile is wedge-shaped. That is, relationships 
deepen from broader and more superficial areas of exchange, 
to layers of greater intimacy and specificity.
Notably, the social penetration work is concerned 
with the time dimension of human relationships. Altman and 
Taylor continuously warn against viewing interpersonal 
relations as static or smooth. Nevertheless, communica­
tion is still considered only a "conveyor” of rewards 
or costs (e.g., positive or negative affect) rather than 
a functional determinant of a relationship.
One construct certainly important to the group 
process and relevant to interpersonal relations is group 
cohesiveness. Group cohesiveness is actually quite 
comparable to interpersonal attraction. The only real 
difference is that interpersonal attraction is usually 
associated with the opportunity to interact rather than
the effects of attractive or rewarding relationships 
after formation.
Cartwright and Zander (1968) and Lott and Lott (1965) 
provide an overview of the cohesiveness literature. 
Essentially, high cohesiveness further increases inter­
personal influence (Back, 1951; Schachter, et al., 1951), 
generates higher productivity (Bjerstedt, 1961), increases 
the quantity and quality of interaction (Lott and Lott, 
1961), increases satisfaction and morale (Marquis, et al., 
1951), and heightens participation and activity (Back, 
1951; Libo, 1953). Nevertheless, the precise nature of 
the causal order among cohesiveness variables remains 
troublesome. Many of the consequences of group cohesive­
ness could also be determinants of cohesiveness. More­
over, though cohesiveness has been defined in terms of 
interpersonal relations and the rewarding or costly 
nature of these relations, the construct allegedly refers 
to a "state" of the group. Most studies experimentally 
manipulate the cohesiveness level of a group and rarely 
take its dynamic properties into account. Therefore, 
rather than specifying the particular interpersonal 
relationships which either do or do not promote cohesive­
ness, research tends to "endow" the group with cohesive­
ness and assume that communicative behaviors are a func­
tion of this state of the group.
The reinforcement orientation has surely contributed
to our understanding of interpersonal relationships.
Yet the perspective is not very useful to the communi­
cation researcher who is interested in observing and 
determining the functions of verbal behavior. Indi­
viduals work through a relationship and determine the 
worth of the relationship by communicating with one 
another, and the efficacy and organizational nature of 
ongoing verbal behavior is overlooked by research within 
the reinforcement paradigm.
Arguing that people somehow construct payoff 
matrices before making a decision is a provocative thought 
but not very realistic. People are not that rational 
(Shepherd, 1964). More importantly, they are limited 
in their abilities to construct such a complex mechanism. 
The reason Thibaut and Kelley's work has not advanced 
significantly beyond the dyad is obvious. Even a four- 
person group constructing a four dimensional payoff 
matrix defies any reasonable limits to complexity. On 
the other hand, the rewards-costs perspective often be­
comes unproductively simple. The literature concludes 
that an existing relationship must be rewarding, and 
because the relationship is rewarding it will continue 
to exist. A similar problem of circularity exists within 
the attraction and cohesiveness literature.
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Cognitive Theories
The cognitive theories of interpersonal interaction 
differ considerably from reinforcement theories. Of 
course, cognitive theorists are not in complete agreement, 
but the following brief explanation should capture the 
flavor of the perspective (see Kretch and Crutchfield, 
1947; Ausubel, 1965).
Unlike the reinforcement theories, cognitive theories 
of interpersonal relations refer to "mentalistic" concepts 
which exist in the heads of individuals. Concepts such 
as understanding, meaning, and knowing play important 
roles in determining the formation and development of 
interpersonal relations. Cognitive theories are concerned 
with thinking, perception, and concept formation rather 
than classical conditioning. Where reinforcement theories 
refer to organismic processes to explain "mental" events, 
cognitive theories emphasize states of consciousness and 
the organization of images and concepts. The research 
which stems from this perspective and relates most 
directly to human relationships deals with the proposi­
tion that people cannot live in states of mental incon­
sistency.
The most fundamental assumption of cognitive consis­
tency is that if cognitions are inconsistent people will 
act to restore consistency. The seminal work of Fritz 
Heider (1946, 1958) draws upon the principles of
11
perceptual organization formulated by the Gestalt psy­
chologists. Heider hypothesized that perception of a 
unit formation between individuals increases interper­
sonal attraction. Strong evidence for this hypothesis 
is reported in Darley and Berscheid (1967), Dickoff 
(1961), and Jones, Gergen, and Davis (1962). And limi­
tations are outlined in Aronson and Linder (1965).
Heider assumes that states of imbalance produce 
forces toward balance or discontinuance. The hypothesis 
that people prefer states of balance is well supported 
by Price, Harburg and Newcomb (1966), and Rodrigues
(1967). And much of the work on attitude similarity 
and attraction (Jones, Gergen, and Davis, 1962; Newcomb, 
1956; and Levinger and Breedlove, 1966) supports the 
hypothesis that agreement increases attraction which 
maintains balance.
A concept similar to Heider’s balance theory was 
advanced by Newcomb (1953). Newcomb took balance out 
of the head of one person and applied it to communication 
among people and relations within groups. Newcomb claimed 
that communication between people sought to establish 
symmetrical orientations.
Unlike Heider's balance theory, Newcomb's A-B-X 
model has stimulated little research beyond the classic 
longitudinal study of the acquaintance process (Newcomb, 
1961, 1963; and Burdick and Burnes, 1958). The research
12
generated by Newcomb's A-B-X model attempted to link 
the variables responsible for strains toward symmetry. 
Steiner (1960) and Steiner and Rogers (1963), for example, 
have demonstrated how personality differences and sex 
affect cognitive imbalance. However, there is little 
research which specifically applies to group communica­
tion. Schachter's (1951) and Festinger and Thibaut's 
(1951) work on pressures toward uniformity in a group 
might be construed as at least tangentially related.
These authors argue that regardless of their origins 
pressures toward uniformity exist in a group. They cite 
the group's tendency to direct communication toward 
deviant members in an effort to maintain uniformity of 
opinion as evidence of this phenomenon.
One area of inquiry which has resulted in confused 
conclusions is the similarity-of-attitudes literature. 
Newcomb's (1961) study of the acquaintance process con­
cluded that attitude similarity produced liking. However, 
later studies by Byrne and Wong (1962) and Levinger and 
Breedlove (1966) take a slightly different stand and 
argue that liking produces the perception of similarity. 
And Rychlak (1965) and Novak and Lerner (1968) demon­
strated quite the opposite, i.e., that similarity and 
attraction may not be related. In any case, the precise 
nature of the similarity-attraction relationship has yet
13
to be specified.
In general, the empirical consequences of the 
cognitive orientation for interpersonal communication 
have been rather limited. Even though Newcomb's A-B-X 
model is often cited as a classical contribution to 
communication theory, its strongest contribution is the 
extension of balance principles to an interpersonal 
relationship. Yet despite this alleged contribution, 
Osgood (1960) has criticized Newcomb for moving too 
easily from the individual to the interpersonal level. 
Heider was originally preoccupied with Gestalt psychology 
and cognitive structural dynamics; the transfer from 
mental systems to social systems is not clearly distin­
guishable. Price, Harburg, and Newcomb (1966), for 
example, failed to verify balance predictions involving 
negative relations among triads. Moreover, Zajonc (1960) 
has criticized the precision of liking and attraction and 
argues that they are situation-specific. Festinger asked, 
according to Zajonc, because a chicken likes chicken feed 
and a person likes chicken, whether that person should 
also like chicken feed. Though the example is facetious, 
it points to some problems with balance theories.
Cognitive theory, and balance theories in particular, 
often refer to the reasons for initiating communication 
(similarity, attraction) or outcomes of communication 
(balance resolution), but never to the process of
14
communication. The very structure of balance theories 
minimizes their ability to examine the process of com­
munication. Experimenters assume that inconsistency 
will be reduced and hence block all modes of reduction 
but the one of interest. At the very least, some exam­
ination of the relevant verbal behavior is necessary.
Psychoanalytic Theory
A third body of literature which bears on the issue 
of interpersonal relations rests on the assumptions of 
psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalytic theory derives 
from Freudian psychology and is concerned with motiva­
tional and personality properties of individuals as they 
relate to group existence. Freud's basic unit was the 
structure of the personality, and all of the relevant 
literature involves understanding or prediction on the 
basis of individual or group personality.
A typical psychoanalytic theory is Bion's (1959,
1961) theory of group functioning. Bion assumed that a 
group was not only a collection of individuals but pos­
sessed emotional and motivational properties of its own. 
Bion refers to certain facets of member relations as 
neurotic assumptions. The assumptions of dependence, 
pairing, and flight-fight determine member relations.
Although Bion's work has attracted very little 
attention among communication scholars, Bormann (1975)
15
claims that some of the results of the Minnesota studies 
are consistent with Bion’s propositions. For example, 
patterns of leadership emergence are consistent with the 
pairing assumption described by Bion. Schutz, on the 
other hand, has been quite successful at generating 
research from a psychoanalytic perspective.
Schutz (1955, 1958) was influenced by Bion and 
formalized postulates and theorems delineating three 
interpersonal needs--inclusion, control, and affection. 
Schutz theorizes that a relationship is satisfactory and 
effective if needs are compatible. Compatibility refers 
to the degree of concurrence between expressed behavior 
and wanted behavior. If a source has a high need to 
express affection and receiver has a high need to receive 
affection, then the relationship is compatible.
The research on the efficacy of compatibility for 
relationship formation and development is cumbersome.
Winch (1955) and Schutz support a compatibility-of-needs 
hypothesis. Based on Schutz*s theorizing, Sapolsky (1965) 
and Vansickle (1963) found that high compatibility dyads 
were more productive. However, Shaw and Nickols (1964) 
report low and nonsignificant correlations between com­
patibility and group cohesiveness and satisfaction.
Altman and Haythorn (1967) also failed to support com­
patibility predictions. An investigation based on need 
achievement, need dominance, and need affiliation found
16
expected compatibility effects for need affiliation 
only.
Frandsen and Rosenfeld (1973) severely criticize 
both Schutz’s theory and his measuring instrument. They 
conclude that the theory is not reasonable because it 
does not distinguish between forms of compatibility. 
Moreover, FIRO-B has a structural bias against the need 
area of control. Control does not seem to be orthogonally 
distinct from inclusion and affection. It is impossible, 
according to Frandsen and Rosenfeld, to acquire an un­
contaminated measure of need for control.
Assessing and measuring personality traits to predict 
individual or group behavior has always been a popular 
pursuit. Personality or trait theories focus on motiva­
tional or personal properties of the individual and 
emphasize the consistency of behavior. The fundamental 
assumption is that there is a response consistency which 
allows one to predict behavior across situations.
Initial efforts sought to link subject variables 
with relationship behavior. Researchers have studied 
age (Beaver, 1932; Dymond, Hughes, and Raake, 1952), sex 
and physical characteristics (Ort, 1950), eye contact 
(Exline), 1963), liking and warmth (Fiedler, 1951), 
assertiveness (Borg, 1960), sociability (Bouchard, 1969), 
and prominence (Shaw, 1959) , as some of the subject 
variables affecting interpersonal relations.
17
The social penetration literature also makes use 
of personality variables. Jourard (1971) found signifi-i 
cant relationships between self-disclosure and MMPI 
scales, and self-concept. Taylor, Altman, and Frankfurt
(1968) support Worthy, Gary, and Kahn (1969) by finding 
no relationship between dogmatism and self-disclosure.
The Taylor (1968) and the Frankfurt studies (1965) con­
firm the suspicion that high revealers disclose more 
than low revealers at all stages of the penetration 
process. Altman and Taylor (1973) also report some bio­
graphical, demographic, and cultural determinants of 
social penetration. While the evidence of a relationship 
between individual differences and social penetration is 
consistent, Altman and Taylor argue that the results are 
not integrative and generally indicate an initial stage 
of research.
Psychoanalytic and personality theories have really 
done little to further our understanding of human rela­
tionships. Psychoanalytic theories are often extremely 
abstract, difficult if not impossible to test (i.e., 
unobservable), and of questionable explanatory utility 
(see Marx and Hillix, 1973, pp. 268-274). Marx and 
Hillix suggest that there is really no such thing as 
psychoanalytic theory, per se. There is only a set of 
concepts derived from Freud which scholars have elaborated 
upon. And these concepts can occasionally be insightful
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and instructive. The assumption of response consistency 
across situations does not seem to be very informative. 
Much of the research within this perspective lends cre­
dence to Sherif and Sherif’s (1965) warning about the 
psychodynamic fallacy which erroneously attributes be­
havior to the individual rather than the interactive 
properties of a context.
The three theories discussed above all approach 
human relationships somewhat differently. In the true 
Kuhnian (1970) sense, neither theoretical position is 
necessarily wrong. Each is capable of unearthing certain 
facts or asking certain questions that the other is not.
A reinforcement theorist who makes no assumptions about 
internal mental states, simply could not ask questions 
about the possible relationship between psychological 
balance and interpersonal relations. Each perspective 
certainly has conceptual merit.
However, none of these perspectives pays direct 
attention to communication. Communication is typically 
included as a network system which affects leadership, 
power, satisfaction, or problem solving efficiency (Shaw, 
1971, pp. 137-148). Few research studies utilize verbal 
behavior in some interactive context as the basic focus 
of analysis. The section which follows briefly outlines 
a set of assumptions which assume that communication 
shapes human relationships. The research questions
19
originate directly from these assumptions.
The Interact System Model
The theoretical foundation for this study is the 
Interact System Model. The ISM is fully developed in 
Fisher and Hawes (1971). Briefly, the ISM uses the 
propositions of modern system theory as a model of com­
munication (see Ellis and Fisher, 1975; and Ellis, 1975). 
The most basic structural unit is the act, i.e., one 
uninterrupted verbal utterance. However, since Weick
(1969) argues that any theory of social organization is 
based on interdependence, interacts (two contiguous acts) 
become the most important observable unit. Communication 
occurs in a social system and order in the system is 
defined by predictably occurring sequences of interaction 
Consequently, relationships emerge and are defined within 
an interactive context. Communication is the basis for 
relationship definition.
The assumptions of the ISM are crucial to the study 
of relationship interaction because the unit of analysis 
is the interact or the exchange of messages. And only by 
tracking combinations of message exchanges do relational 
qualities become apparent.
Watzlawick et al. (1967, p. 49) maintain that all 
communication has both a content and a relationship 
dimension. The content level of communication is the
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simple conveyance of information (data). The relationship 
level provides information about the information (metain­
information) and classifies the content. Jackson (1965, 
p. 7) clarifies when he writes that the relationship 
aspect of a communicative act can be taken to read, "this 
is how you are to see me in relation to you."
The elementary modes of relational communication 
refer to control in the relationship. An individual may 
occupy a primary or "one-up" (+) position, a secondary or 
"one-down" (4-) position, or define the relationship as 
equal (-*) . Message combinations form either complementary 
or symmetrical relationships. Complementarity pertains to 
those cases where the behaviors and aspirations of indi­
viduals are interlocked but fundamentally different. A 
complementary relationship occurs as one individual holds 
a "one-up" (+) position, and the other a "one-down" (+) 
position--e.g., dominance-submission and succor-dependence. 
Such complementary exchanges include giving and taking 
instructions, or asking and answering questions. Sym­
metrical interaction is based on equivalence. Both inter­
actants stress the same definition of the relationship, 
e.g., superiority, deference, or parity. Some examples 
of symmetrical interaction might be agreement followed by 
agreement or giving orders and countering with orders.
On the content level, a number of authors have 
reported results (see Bales and Strodtbeck, 1951; Fisher,
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1970; Scheidel and Crowell, 1964; Ellis and Fisher,
1974). However, research examining relational interaction 
is sparse. Sluzki and Beavin (1965) were the first to 
operationalize complementarity and symmetry. They dis­
cuss in some detail complementarity and symmetry and 
provide insights into coding relational interaction.
Mark (1970) further operationalized relational interaction 
and stimulated Glover (1974) to apply the system to a 
family setting. Glover found that complementarity and 
symmetry were significant and frequent forms of interac­
tion. Rogers (1972) , and Millar (1973) also report data 
based on family interaction. Except for Farace and 
Rogers’ (1974) reconceptualization of relational inter­
action, little further research exists.
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of the present study is to test the 
utility of a coding scheme for measuring relational 
interaction and investigate the nature of relational 
interaction in decision making and consciousness-raising 
groups.
Since the emergence and development of interpersonal 
relations in a group setting is important, an understanding 
of relational interaction becomes essential. Moreover, 
communication functionally interstructures group behavior 
and studying relationship formation and development from
a communicative perspective seems most useful. The 
study investigated the following research questions.
1. What types of relational interaction character­
ize a decision-making group?
2. What types of relational interaction character­
ize a consciousness-raising group?
3. What, if any, are the differences in relational 
interaction between a decision-making group and a 
consciousness-raising group?
4. Do the patterns of relational interaction in a 
decision-making group change over time?
5. Do the patterns of relational interaction in a 
consciousness-raising group change over time?
6. Does the interaction produced by any dyadic 
relationship in a decision-making group differ from the 
composite group interaction?
7. Does the interaction produced by any dyadic 
relationship in a consciousness-raising group differ 




Previous research points to the inadequacies of 
highly restricted laboratory settings for the analysis 
of interaction. Subjects asked to volunteer for brief 
laboratory studies are often easily manipulated and have 
low levels of commitment. Moreover, structured laboratory 
settings do not lend themselves to the observation of 
ongoing interaction over time. When subjects are forced 
to choose among arbitrary alternatives or denied the op­
portunity to develop stable relationships, any charac­
terization of the interaction as either generalizable or 
representative is suspect. Both decision-making groups 
and consciousness-raising groups develop through charac­
teristic phases of interaction (see Bales and Strodtbeck, 
1951; Fisher, 1970; Ellis, 1974; and Eastman, 1973). 
Therefore, this research used naturally developing groups 
as data.
Selection of Groups 
The consciousness-raising groups used in this study 
were actual groups formed as a result of people volun­
teering for this particular type of human relations
experience. Two consciousness-raising groups were se- 
lected--one from Salt Lake City, Utah and the other from 
Reno, Nevada. Because the consciousness-raising groups 
were not newly developed and had continued for several 
months, their entire histories were not available. There­
fore, the consciousness-raising data in this study con­
sist of four hours of interaction drawn from the middle 
of each group’s history. This procedure reduced the data 
to manageable size. Also, by this point in time the 
groups should have developed normative behaviors.
The decision-making groups were two classroom groups 
enrolled in the basic course in group decision making at 
the University of Utah. Unlike the consciousness-raising 
groups, the entire history of the decision-making groups 
was available. These groups met weekly for a period of 
one academic quarter. The first meeting to the last con­
stituted the group's entire history. Group one had six 
meetings and group two had five meetings. The two groups 
generated 8.5 hours of interaction. The decision-making 
groups in the basic course are an integral part of the 
course and help determine final grades. Member commit­
ment, then, should not be a problem.
Both types of groups operated in a naturally develop­
ing context. They had few external restrictions placed 
upon them and were not composed according to subject or 
task variables. The author had no contact with the
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consciousness-raising groups, and provided few, if any, 
instructions for the decision-making groups. This pro­
cedure allowed individual group norms, patterns of in­
teraction, message strategies, and relationship defini­
tions to emerge regardless of compositional variables.
Interaction was primarily oral. This research fo­
cussed on verbal behavior. Nonverbal behavior was not 
considered.
A semi-permanent record of all interaction was avail­
able. The interaction of each group was recorded on 
audio-tape.
Data Collection
All groups used in this study were tape recorded. 
Members were informed of the confidential nature of the 
tapes. The consciousness-raising tapes were supplied by 
a colleague. The classroom decision-making groups re­
ceived tapes and a recorder and were asked to record all 
group interaction. The- author maintained contact to 
check on recording problems and replenish tapes. At the 
completion of the quarter the tapes were gathered and 
coded.
Coding
The tape recorded interaction was submitted to in­
teraction analysis using an original coding system 
developed by the author. Members of the consciousness-
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raising groups agreed to record their interaction for 
research purposes. However, they were concerned about 
who was listening to the tapes. Therefore, the colleague 
who provided the tapes coded the consciousness-raising 
group interaction and was the only person to actually 
hear the tapes. The author coded all of the decision­
making data.
The system describing the interaction contains the 
following mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.
Dimension I Speaker Identification
1 - N





Dimension III Relation to Previous Comment
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0. Nonextended
1 . Informative Extension
2. Elaborative Extension
3. Justification
4. Simple Personal Support
5. Extended Personal Support
6. Ideational Support
7. Extended Ideational Support
8. Personal Nonsupport
9. Extended Personal Nonsupport
10. Ideational Nonsupport
11. Extended Ideational Nonsupport
12. Initiate New Direction
13. Other
A complete explanation of the coding system including 
operationalizations and rules for transforming categories 
into ++, +-, + + , 4--, and -* appears in Appendix A.
Following Sluzki and Beavin's (1965) suggestion that 
relational interaction is a combination of grammatical 
form and response style, a coding scheme was devised to 
tap these dimensions of a message. After identifying the 
speaker, the second dimension codes grammatical form, 
and the third dimension classifies the message according 
to how it relates to the previous message. On the basis 
of this coding procedure, each message is transformed into 
either a strong up (++), a weak up ( + -) , a strong down 
(4- + ), a weak down ( + -), or one-across (-*•). These trans­
formations represent dominance, submission, or equality 
respectively.
Complementary relationships are operationalized as 
any down (++,+-) following any up (++,+-), or any up 
following any down. Complementary transactions refer to 
message pairs which are dissimilar in control direction. 
Therefore, if a particular dyadic relationship is char­
acterized by one person always in a dominant position 
(t) , and the other always in a submissive position (4-) , 
then the relationship is complementary. The precise 
nature of this complementarity may vary. The relationship 
may be one of a leader instructing a follower ( + + ) , or 
information exchanges between one person who seeks infor­
mation (+) and the other who provides information (+).
In either case, the individual behaviors are fundamentally 
different but interlocked.
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Symmetrical relationships feature paired messages 
with the same control direction (++++/+++-/+-+-/+-++/; ++++/ 
+++-/+-+-/+-++/; or -*->-). This type of relationship often 
depicts competition for control of some position in the 
relationship. The exception to this competition is the -*-*■ 
interact which is based on a mutual definition of equality. 
There are three types of symmetry. An up followed by an 
up (++++/+++-/+-+-/+-++) is competitive symmetry. Competi­
tive symmetry is usually the result of the struggle over 
which interactant will control the up position in the 
definition of the relationship. A down followed by a down 
(++++/+++-/+-+-/+-++) is submissive symmetry, and indica­
tive of a struggle over who will occupy the submissive 
position in the relationship. Equivalent symmetry (-*-*) is 
based on participant equality and an expression of the 
interactants1 mutual definition of parity.
The remaining exchanges include any up or down fol­
lowed by an across (++-»•/ + --»■/++-►/ + —*■) , or any across pre­
ceding an up or down (->-h+/-►+-/-*■++/->+-). These relation­
ships have been considered ambiguous. Table 1 illustrates 
all possible relational exchanges.
A test for reliability (Guetzkow, 1950, pp. 47-50) 
was performed on 172 units of interaction selected from 
group transcriptions. Interrater reliability among each 
pair of three trained coders averaged .81 for dimension 
three (p. <.01).
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Matrix of Relationship Types
Table 1





































-> Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous Equivalent
Symmetry
After coding half the data, the two coders conducted 
another test for reliability to check for decay. Reli­
ability between the two coders maintained an acceptable 
level. (.80, p. <. 01).
This system of coding relational interaction is 
slightly different from others used in the past. First, 
some indication of relational intensity has been added. 
Rogers and Farace (1975, p. 234) indicate that some 
measure of intensity is necessary because the various 
messages codable as either an up or a down do not contain 
the same "amounts" of up or down. An order, for example, 
is stronger than an instruction. Therefore the + or - 
sign by the up or down is an indication of the strength 
of the control attempt. The imperative category in 
dimension two has been added and is always transformed 
into a strong up or down. Also, the categories referring 
to personal support or nonsupport often transform into 
strong control attempts and have been added to increase 
precision. Attacking or disconfirming someone at the 
personal level is certainly more intense than simply 
disagreeing with an idea or opinion.
The addition of the strong and weak intensity measures 
increases the size of the interact matrix from 3 x 3 to 
5 x 5 .  There are now four measures of competitive and 
submissive symmetry and eight measures of complementarity. 
While the relationship definitions remain the same,
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degrees of symmetry or complementarity may vary. Since 
being "more" or "less” equal is impossible, the one-across 
code has no intensity measure.
Finally, this coding procedure reconceptualizes the 
one-across category. Ericson and Rogers (1973) first 
added the one-across category to the original up and down 
codings. However, they conceived of one-across as neu­
tralized symmetry or the absence of definition of the 
relationship. All uncodable responses, incompletes, 
unclassified comments, and simple extension were coded 
one-across. Such a conceptualization of the one-across 
category is problematic. First, it is theoretically 
inconsistent. Both Ericson and Rogers (1973) and Rogers 
and Farace (1975) support the assumptions of Watzlawick, 
Beavin, and Jackson and cite their second axiom about 
the content and relationship levels of communication. 
However, their definition of one-across assumes no defin­
ition of the relationship. If all communication has a 
relationship dimension, then they cannot consider -*■ as 
neutralized or nondefinitional.
Secondly, such a conceptualization of one-across 
leaves no room for the relationship which is based on 
equivalence, e.g., friends and peers. Otherwise the 
only types of symmetry are competitive and submissive. 
Redefining the one-across code as equivalent symmetry 
allows for the discovery of those attempts at relational
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equality. Relational equality is not necessarily "better" 
than complementarity--just different. Complementarity 
is a very efficient mode of relational interaction and 
probably characterizes a large percentage of most rela­
tionships. However, interactants often make attempts to 
be equal, and by redefining the one-across code, these 
attempts should become apparent.
Data Analysis 
The basic unit of interaction analysis is the act.
An act is one uninterrupted verbal utterance. When a 
speaker's comment is interrupted, his act terminates and 
another speaker's act begins.
An interact is a contiguous pair of acts. That is, 
when person A emits an act which stimulates an act from 
person B, that unit is an interact. Person A provides the 
antecedent act and B the subsequent act and together they 
comprise a single interact. An interaction matrix is 
then generated with rows as antecedent acts and columns 
as subsequent acts. This matrix represents interact fre­
quencies, or the frequency with which each row unit is 
followed by each column unit (see Fisher, 1970; Fisher and 
Hawes, 1971).
The data were subjected to a Markov statistical 
analysis (see Attneave, 1959, pp. 43-67; Garner, 1962, 
pp. 98-137; Hawes and Foley, 1973; and Ellis and Fisher,
1975). The Markov model generates transition probabilities
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or the probability of entering one of the states from the 
last state occupied. The five-state system used in this 
research generated a 5 x 5 matrix with 25 possible 
second-order transitions.
This matrix illustrates the most and least used 
categories of interaction and designates the predominant 
modes of relational interaction. When a cell contained a 
frequency and transition probability greater than random 
expectations, the cell contributed to structure in the 
matrix.
To answer the question of change over time, the data 
from the two group systems were divided into thirds and 
fourths and subjected to an Anderson-Goodman (1957) test. 
The Anderson-Goodman test compares an individual time 
period matrix to a composite matrix (the total of all 
individual matrices). The Anderson-Goodman statistic has 
a chi square distribution. A statistically significant 
overall Anderson-Goodman signifies change in the interac­
tion over time. The Anderson-Goodman statistic for a 
particular state, then, indicates that the transition 
probabilities from the state in a particular time period 
differ from the composte interaction.
Finally, each dyadic relationship with each speaker 
as antecedent and each as subsequent was profiled, i.e., 
all possible dyadic relationships for each of the four 
groups. Each dyad matrix was compared to the composite
matrix to test for differences. This comparison tested 
the assumption of homogeneity (Kullback and Kupperman,
1962). The assumption of homogeneity supposes that no 
subgroups in the population have substantially different 
transition probabilities. A significant homogeneity 
test indicated whether the interaction of a particular 





This chapter reports the results of the study as 
they relate to the research questions. Essentially, the 
research questions deal with the descriptive nature of 
the data; a comparison of the two group systems; the 
analysis of change over time; and the question of dyadic 
relationships.
Data Description 
Describing the interaction involves identifying those 
cells which induce structure in the matrix. These cells 
symbolize the relational interacts which characterize 
the group system. A cell contributes to structure when 
its frequency and transition probability are greater 
than random.
Decision-Making Groups
The two decision-making groups were compared to one 
another using the Anderson-Goodman procedure. This pro­
cedure computes a composite matrix consisting of both 
groups and compares each separate group to the composite. 
The obtained Anderson-Goodman for this comparison was non­
significant (AG = 43.19; df = 40) and indicates that the
interaction of the two decision-making groups was not 
significantly different. Therefore, all further analysis 
refers to the combined decision-making group data. Appen­
dix B contains all composite matrices.
The combined decision-making groups produced 5,496 
units of interaction. Random frequency in the decision­
making composite is 219, and all cells must have a transi­
tion probability greater than .20 to contribute to struc­
ture. Asterisks in the composite matrices refer to those 
cells which meet these criteria. Moreover, since the 
distribution of data (frequency), rather than transition 
probabilities, is a more important contributor to matrix 
structure and often refers to patterned interaction those 
cells which exceed random frequency but do not have a 
transition probability above .20 are also identified.
The structured cells in the decision-making data are 
+ - + - (238, .21), +--► (705, .60), +--*■ (357, .62), ->+- (742 , 
.21), and -»-»• (2145, .63). Cell exceeds random fre­
quency (338) but has a transition probability below .20.
Consciousness-Raising
Groups
The two consciousness-raising groups were also com­
pared to one another using the Anderson-Goodman statistic. 
However, these two groups were significantly different 
(AG = 187.23; df = 40; p. <.01). Therefore, the data 
generated from the consciousness-raising groups were not
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combined, and the interaction of each consciousness- 
raising group was analyzed separately.
The interaction of the first consciousness-raising 
group is also reported in Appendix B. This group pro­
duced 2,105 units of interaction with a random cell fre­
quency of 84. Unlike the decision-making data, this 
consciousness-raising group exhibited only two cells 
which exceed both random frequency and transition pro­
bability--^- (169, . 70), and ->4 (1322, .80). Cell +--► 
(160) surpasses random frequency but not the random 
transition probability.
The interaction of the second consciousness-raising 
group appears in Appendix B. There were 3,242 units of 
interaction for this group with a random cell frequency 
of 130. Cells +--*■ (134, .83) and (2578, .89) contrib­
ute to structure. Cell -*■+- exceeds only random frequency.
Decision-Making Compared 
to Consciousness - 
Raising Groups"
One comparison of the decision-making and 
consciousness-raising groups matches the decision-making 
data against each of the consciousness-raising groups. 
Table 2 reports the results of comparing the decision­
making groups with the first consciousness-raising group. 
The table reports structured cells which are the same in 





















Interacts Inducing Structure in Decision-Making Groups 
Compared to First Consciousness-Raising Group
Table 2
Decision-Making Consciousness-Raising
+ -* + - ->
t  -
4 , - *
-»•
+ - + “
*Exceeds RF only
The table indicates that all cells which contribute to 
structure in the first consciousness-raising group also 
induce structure in the decision-making groups. However, 
two cells ( + - + -, and +--»■) exceed only random expectations 
in the decision-making groups. These two units capture 
the differences in the interaction between the decision­
making groups and the first consciousness-raising group.
The decision-making groups reflect more competitive 
symmetry (+-+-) and instances of equality following 
deference ( + --*-).
Table 3 summarizes the data generated by comparing 
the decision-making data with the second consciousness- 
raising group. In this comparison three cells produce 
structure in the decision-making groups only--competitive 
symmetry (+-+-), dominance attempts followed by equivalence 
( + --»■), and equivalence followed by dominance (-»■+-).
A second comparison between group systems involved 
combining all decision-making data and all consciousness- 
raising data and comparing the two systems directly. This 
comparison is problematic because earlier analysis indi­
cates that the two consciousness-raising groups systems 
were dissimilar and therefore should not be combined for 
a composite analysis. However, the result of this compar­
ison is so large (AG = 800.52; df = 40; p. <.01) that it 
warrants special attention. Appendix B also contains the 




















Interacts Inducing Structure in Decision-Making Groups 
Compared to Second Consciousness-Raising Group
Table 3
Decision-Making Consciousness-Raising
+  -  -*
-V + - * -> 4. -  *
f  -  +  -
+  -  ->
t  -
*Exceed RF only
consciousness-raising groups produced 5,251 units of 
interaction, approximately the same as the 5,496 interacts 
included in the decision-making data.
Table 4 summarizes the Anderson-Goodman statistic for 
each row of both group systems. The null hypothesis for 
each of the five rows (states) is that the transition 
probabilities from this state are the same in the partic­
ular group matrix as in the composite matrix created by 
combining both group systems. For example, the figure 
in the decision-making column for the ++ row (11.9) means 
that the transition probabilities from the t+ row differ 
in the decision-making groups when compared to the com­
posite of all groups. In the consciousness-raising groups 
the null hypothesis was rejected for all states except 
the ++ state. And in the decision-making groups only 
transitions from states and -»■ differ significantly 
from the composite matrix.
Table 5 is similar to Tables 2 and 3 except that 
Table 5 illustrates structured cells for all decision­
making data compared to all consciousness-raising data.
The only cell which uniquely induces structure in one 
group but not the other is the +-+- cell. However, the 
- interact only exceeds random frequency in the 
consciousness-raising groups and thereby contributes less 
structure than the same interact in the decision-making 
groups. Examination of both Tables 4 and 5 reveals that
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Anderson and Goodman Measures for Combined 




t + 11.0* 19.6*
t - 3.7 16.4*
+ + .35 3.6
+ - 5.7 15.9*
- y 350.6* 372.34*
*P. < .05





















Interacts Inducing Structure in Decision-Making Groups 
Compared to Combined Consciousness-Raising Groups
Decision-Making Consciousness-Raising
t- -> f - ->
4- - -* 4-- ->
f - + + _*




while the strong up state (++) has a significant Anderson- 
Goodman value, no cell contributes to structure in either 
of the two groups. This simply indicates that even 
though the transition probabilities from the ++ state in 
each group differ from the composite, the state does not 
induce sufficient structure in the individual group 
composite. Interacts using ++, then, may differ between 
the two groups, but they do not account for a sufficient 
number of interacts to structure the particular group 
systems.
Phasic Analysis 
The phasic analysis addresses the issue of change 
over time. This is the assumption of stationarity or 
whether the parameters of the interacting system are 
uniformly stable over time. Nonstationary parameters 
indicate that the interaction within a time period is 
distinct from composite interaction.
Decision-Making Groups
The pooled decision-making data were divided into 
both thirds and fourths and tested for significant 
changes over time. Table 6 summarizes the Anderson- 
Goodman statistic for each state when the data were 
divided into thirds. The overall Anderson-Goodman 
statistic is significant (AG = 108.21; df = 60; p. <.01) 




Results of Anderson and Goodman Measures 




f + 2.42 3.73 1.33
+ - 4.67 3.24 1. 27
+ + 7.66 3.18 3.77
i- 7.55 6.52 9.87*
-> 12.62* 17.87* 22.55*
*p < .05
Overall A-G = 108.31; df = 60; p.< .01
periods. The one-across state O) varies from the com­
posite in each time period, and the weak down (+-) state 
in the third time period differs from the composite data. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis for a particular state in 
a phase means that the transition probabilities from 
that state differ significantly in that time period when 
compared to the composite. The value of 12.62 with four 
degrees of freedom, for example, in phase one for the ■+• 
state indicates that the transition probabilities from 
the state are different in phase one when compared to 
the composite data.
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the transition probabilities 
from the significant states and compares these transition 
probabilities to the transition probabilities in the com­
posite matrix. Table 6 reports that the one-across (-►) 
row varies significantly in all three time periods.
Table 7, then, reports the transition probabilities for 
all interacts generated by the -* row in the three signifi­
cant phases. For example, the .03 in the -M- + cell is 
exactly the same as the transition probability in the 
composite cell. This cell does not account for the varia­
tion in the state during phase one. Moving across the 
row, however, the -M-- cell has a transition probability 
which is higher than the transition probability for the 
same cell in the composite matrix. The cell, then, is 
partially responsibile for the significant variation in
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Table 7
Transition Probabilities from - * ■ Row
Compared to the Composite
Phases ++ t- + - -*■
Phase One . 03 .25 .02 .09 .58
Phase Two .01 .22 .01 .08 .65
Phase Three .05 .17 .01 .11 .64
Composite .03 .21 .01 .10 .63
Table 8
Transition Probabilities from +- Row
Compared to the Composite
Phases t + + - + + 4--
Phase
three .02 .18 .01 .09 .68
Composite .03 .25 .01 . 06 .62
phase two. Table 8 is read in the same manner but reports 
the results for the +- state which was significant only 
during phase three. Again, this procedure is purely 
descriptive and attempts only to account for the reported 
statistical significance.
The next phasic analysis divided the data into 
fourths. The overall Anderson-Goodman statistic for 
this analysis was also significant (AG = 163.32; df = 80; 
p. <.01), and Table 9 reports Anderson-Goodman values for 
each state across the four phases. Table 9 is interpreted 
precisely the same as Table 6. In Table 9 the ++ state 
in phase three and +- in phases three and four do not 
reach a significance level of .05. However, since these 
states approach significance (p. <.10) and may account for 
the accumulated variance in the overall statistic, they 
are tabled in the following section.
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Results of Anderson and Goodman Measures 




1 2  3 4
++ 1.82 2.63 3.19 1.34
+ - 3.24 1.17 17.87* 1.42
7.2 6.67 7.77** 5.7
+ - S.21 6.11 7.77** 8.35**
■+ 9.43* 11.33* 28.77* 26.22**
*p. < .05 
**P. < .10
Overall A-G = 163.32; df = 80; p. < .01
Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 summarize the transition 
probabilities for states f~, 4-+, +-, and -*■ respectively. 
These tables also are interpreted exactly as Tables 7 and 
8. They illustrate the differences in transition proba­
bilities from each state within a phase compared to those 
equivalent transitions in the composite matrix.
Table 10
Transition Probabilities from +- Row 
Compared to the Composite
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Phases t + + - + + + - -*■
Phase
three .007 .19 .05 .11 .62
Composite .04 . 20 .03 .14 .60
Consciousness-Raising
Groups
Since the consciousness-raising groups differed 
significantly from each other, they could not be combined 
for a phasic analysis. Therefore, each group was analyzed 
separately, and each was divided into both thirds and 
fourths. Except for the first consciousness-raising 
group divided into fourths, all phasic analyses were 
nonsignificant. The second group reflected stationary
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Table 11
Transition Probabilities from ++ Row
Compared to the Composite
Phases + + + - + + + - ->
Phase Three .12 .15 .12 .05 .55
Composite .06 .20 .04 .09 .61
Table 12
Transition Probabilities from +- Row 
Compared to the Composite
Phases t+ + - + - ->
Phase Three .07 .25 .01 .02 .63
Phase Four .02 .19 .005 .09 .68
Composite . 03 .25 .01 . 06 .62
Table 13
Transition Probabilities from -* Row
Compared to the Composite
Phases +.+ t - 4* + + - ->
Phase one .04 .24 .02 .10 . 58
Phase two .02 .25 .01 OOo0 .62
Phase
three .02 .19 .02 .07 . 70
Phase
four . 05 .18 . 01 . 13 . 60
Composite . 03 .21 .01 .10 .63
parameters whether the group was divided into thirds 
(AG = 68.39; df = 60; NSD) or fourths (AG = 90.20; df =
80; NSD); and the first consciousness-raising group re­
flected stationarity when divided into three time periods 
(AG = 79.08; df = 60; NSD). However, the creation of 
four time periods for the first consciousness-raising 
group yielded a significant result (AG = 142.59; df = 80; 
p . <.01).
Table 14 displays the Anderson-Goodman statistics for 
all states across the four phases for the first 
consciousness-raising group. The ■* row is significant in 
phases one, three, and four. And the ++ and +- rows 
approach significance in phase one.
Tables 15, 16, and 17 report the transition probabil­
ities for the three significant states in Table 14. These 
state probabilities are compared to composite transition 
probabilities and indicate which cells contribute to 
significant variation within a time period.
Dyadic Analysis 
The dyadic analyses test the assumption of homoge­
neity measure suggests that the interaction produced by 
a subgroup (dyad) of the population (group) differs from 
the composite interaction.
Decision-Making Groups










++ 9.04** 7.6 .47 2.68
+ - 8.10** 3.3 3.38 4.31
4- + 1.04 . 52 2.99 2.34
+ - 3.13 5.6 5. 53 3.02
-> 11.13* 7.2 47.47* 13.54*
*p. <.05 
**p. <.10
Overall A-G = 142.59; df = 80; p. <.01
Table 15
Transition Probabilities from ++ Row
Compared to the Composite
Phases ++ + - + + + - ->
Phase
one . 22 .07 0.0 0.0 . 70
Composite .12 .07 0.0 .13 .67
Table 16
Transition Probabilities from +- Row 
Compared to the Composite
Phases ++ + - + + + - ->
Phase
one . 02 . 26 . 02 . 08 .60
Composite .03 .15 .008 .10 . 70
Table 17
Transition Probabilities from -> Row
Compared to the Composite
Phases t+ + - + + + -
Phase
one .05 .11 0.0 . 07 .76
Phase
three .03 .02 .008 .05 .90
Phase
four .05 .13 .01 .04 . 75
Composite .03 .10 .006 . 05 .80
each pair of speakers was formed for every dyadic rela­
tionship in both groups. That is, each speaker as the 
antecedent speaker is matched with every other subsequent 
speaker, and a matrix is generated displaying the inter­
action which characterizes each particular dyad. Tables 
18 and 19 report the homogeneity measures for all dyads 
in decision-making groups one and two respectively. For 
example, the 30.64 in the 1-2 cell of Table 18 designates 
the interaction generated by speaker one as antecedent 
and speaker two as subsequent as significantly different 
from the composite interaction. In Table 18 all dyads 
including speaker one as the subsequent speaker differ sig­
nificantly from the composite. And speaker one as the 
antecedent speaker forms significant dyadic relationships 
with two other members as subsequent interactants.
Table 19 shows speaker two as the antecedent speaker 
generated significant homogeneity measures in combination 
with every other member. The only other significant 
homogeneity measures include speaker two as subsequent to 
speaker one, and in the interaction formed by members four 
and three. Appendices C and D contain the matrices for 
















Results of Homogeneity Measures for All Dyads
in First Decision-Making Group
Subsequent
Speaker
1 2 3 4 5
1 -- 30.64** 10.3 22.9 34.48*
2 30.28** --- 19. 85 24. 88 16. 31
3 29.47** 23.10
i »
--- 18. 21 12.4
4 33.63* 19. 04 23.63 --- 16. 86














Results of Homogeneity Measures for All Dyads 
in Second Decision-Making Group
Subsequent
Speaker
1 2 3 4
1 --- 32.65* 19.48 20.3
2 34.72* --- 32.88* 29.14**
3 24.04 18.1 --- 20. 83




raising group, which barely exceeds p. <.10 (28.92; df = 
20), no other dyadic relationship in any of the 
consciousness-raising groups is significant. All combina­
tions of dyadic interaction in the consciousness-raising 
groups are homogeneous with the composite interaction. 





This chapter discusses each research question. The 
chapter is organized according to the presentation of 
results. These involve the descriptive question comparing 
the interaction of the two types of groups; the comparison 
between groups; the issue of change over time; and the 
nature of dyadic relationships within all groups. The 
final section of the chapter discusses limitations and 
implications for future research.
Discussion
Descriptive Characteristics
The structure-inducing cells reflect the interaction 
characteristic of each group system. After describing 
the interaction of decision-making groups and each 
consciousness-raising group, the following section compares 
and contrasts the interaction patterns of both group 
systems. A set of theoretical assumptions are offered 
which account for the interactional differences in the 
two group-systems.
Decision-making groups. The most obvious conclusion
concerning the descriptive qualities of decision-making 
groups is the striking predominance of equivalent sym­
metry. The entire row constitutes 61 percent of the 
interaction and equivalent symmetry (->-»■) accounts for 39 
percent. The next highest percentage of interaction is 
the -H*- cell, and it constitutes only 13 percent of the 
interaction. Mutual definitions of equality where dif­
ferences between interactants are minimized seems to be 
a normative interaction pattern. It is very probable 
(.63) that given the initiation of a ^ function, the sub­
sequent function will also be ■+.
In many respects this finding is consistent with past 
research. Though Rogers and Farace (1975) , Mark (1971), 
and Ellis (1976) used a coding system slightly different 
from the one employed in this study, each system has a 
category for simple extension of the previous comment.
And this category is tansformed into An inspection of 
the coded interaction indicates that the continuous ex­
tension of the previous comment accounts for much of the 
equivalent symmetry in the decision-making data. Group 
members appear to spend a large portion of time extending, 
elaborating, and providing personal opinions about the 
comments of others. After a group member introduces an 
idea, other members extend and support the idea before 
passing judgment and moving to another issue. Defining 
member relationships as equal contributes to an atmosphere
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of inquiry and freedom to participate which is crucial 
to the generation of information.
The extensive use of equivalent symmetry is also 
consistent with the interactional context of the decision­
making groups. Group members did not hold predetermined 
role positions or have sufficient prior contact with other 
group members to formulate any expectations of interper­
sonal relations. These groups functioned in a naturally 
developing context which is conducive to mutual definitions 
of equality.
The +-+- interact (competitive symmetry) also induces 
structure in the decision-making groups. However, the 
t-f- interact is not a forceful attempt to dominate. The 
+ - function is produced by either informative extensions 
or disagreement and plays an important role during the 
entire history of the group. Simple conflict (contiguous 
statements of disagreement) and sequences of informative 
extension which broaden or focus the interaction produce 
competitive symmetry. Moreover, contention for control or 
leadership roles manifests itself in "one-up" attempts 
(++ or +-).
Competitive symmetry is analogous to "one-upmanship" 
or a game of contention which must ultimately be resolved. 
Group members may contend for positions of dominance in a 
relationship, but inevitably one member must assume the 
submissive role or at least agree to support the dominance
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attempt. However, this is an important distinction be­
tween the ++ and the +- functions. The weak up (+-) in 
this study is best considered an attempt at initiation 
rather than "dominance.” The ++ act is probably a more 
obvious attempt to dominate the relationship. The ++ 
functions are either blatant topic changes which control 
the interaction; disconfirmation at the personal rather 
than ideological level; or imperatives. The +- function, 
on the other hand, is a simple effort to influence rather 
than control the interaction.
The +-+- interact is an expression of traditional 
conflict in decision-making groups. Each interactant 
competes for a managerial or directive position in the 
relationship. The t- function reflects socially ac­
ceptable communicative efforts to modify, refine, and test 
the ideas present in the interaction. When one individual 
initiates influence (+-), and another individual chal­
lenges (+-), relational conflict is the result. Sub­
stantive conflict is important and functional to the 
decision-making process. As interactants struggle for a 
scarce position of influence they test ideas and increase 
the options available to the group.
On the other hand, a ++++ interact symbolizes compe­
tition for dominance. This interact is also competitive 
symmetry but qualitatively different from +-+- competitive 
symmetry. Group members attempting to dominate seek to
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restrict the behaviors of others. This relational mode 
is less socially acceptable. Orders, commands, or per­
sonal disconfirmation often engenders negative affiliative 
responses and do not promote an atmosphere or open dis­
cussion. While + - + - competitive symmetry is a significant 
verbal function in decision-making groups, t+t+ interacts 
are extremely rare.
Other related coding schemes (Mark, 1971; and Rogers 
and Farace, 1975) consider statements of agreement defer­
ential or one-down (4-). However, this coding system de­
fines supportive statements as efforts to equalize of 
identify with the previous speaker. Therefore when a 
group member supports another member’s initiation of new 
information, the interact appears as a The serves
to indicate the subsequent members association with the 
previous speaker.
The data clearly display a cyclical pattern of 
interaction among the +--*•, and -*•+- interacts. A 
cyclic pattern is a set of system states such that the 
most probable transitions are to members of the set (see 
Hawes and Foley, 1973). The cyclical pattern formed by 
the + - and states is an initiation pattern where infor­
mation is processed by group members. Figure 1 graphs the 
transitions within this cyclical pattern.
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Figure 1. Cyclical pattern of information 
initiation.
The pattern is set into motion with the introduction 
of new information (+-). The most probable transition 
from the state is to support or extension (->) , thereby 
forming a +—>■ interact. And since the most probable 
transition from ->■ is to another -*, the -+-*■ interact func­
tions to extend and support the original initiation. The 
high proportion of equivalent symmetry (-»->■) suggest that 
the process of extending and supporting generates long 
chains of interaction. Group members find this relational 
definition most comfortable for discussing ideas. When 
equivalent symmetry is interrupted, the most probable 
transition is back to +-, thereby returning the cycle to 
its initial state. Occasionally, a group member seeks to 
influence others ( + -) and is challenged by another influ­
ence attempt. The second most probable transition from 
+- is to another +- (.21). This form of conflict induces 
structure in the decision-making interaction and appears 
sporadically throughout the cyclical pattern.
The final cell which structures the decision-making 
data is not a part of the interaction cycle outlined 
above. The +- function symbolizes moderate deference to 
a source of knowledge. Unlike the 4-+ which implies 
extreme submission, the 4-- is a form of yielding or 
conformity. A common act in decision-making groups 
which symbolizes deference is the question. Interactants 
publicly express their ignorance and yield to a source of 
knowledge. The +--*■ interact is the result of those group 
members who seek information from others or submit to the 
authority of others.
Though Glover (1974) studied family systems, his con­
clusion that some people use a down function to "let" 
others assert their authority seems applicable here. An 
intuitive conclusion drawn by the author from listening 
to the tapes of the interaction supports the assumption 
that interactants purposely defer to others. During a 
series of +'s group members often yield to others in an 
effort to control the direction of the interaction. The 
down relationship definition in the form of a question 
functions to force another group member to respond. Most 
group members respond with personal opinion (->) which 
does not change the level of abstraction in the group. 
Those group members who respond with new information 
(+-) form a complementary relationship with the other 
member. While complementarity is the second most probable
transition from the 4-- state, it does not contribute to 
structure in the matrix.
No other forms of relational interaction characterize 
the decision-making groups. In an earlier study Ellis 
(1976) found considerable complementarity in decision­
making groups. Though the study used a different coding 
system, complementarity is an intuitively appealing form 
of relationship definition. Nevertheless, these data in­
dicate that only 7 percent of the interaction was comple­
mentary interaction as opposed to 29 percent in the earlier 
study. Moreover, submissive symmetry in any form (++++/ 
4-++-/+ -4-+/4--+-) is almost nonexistent in these groups.
The combination of all cells defined as submissive sym­
metry constitute only about one percent of the interaction. 
Contention for the submissive position in a relationship 
is an atypical mode of interaction and usually takes the 
form of mutual exchanges of person support--which are 
extremely brief.
Consciousness-raising groups. Because the two 
consciousness-raising groups were significantly different 
from one another, they must be discussed as separate 
group systems. This section discusses each of the 
consciousness-raising groups. The following section 
will then compare consciousness-raising and decision­
making groups.
In the first consciousness-raising group equivalent
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symmetry is the most probable type of interaction and 
induces the most structure in the data. The largest per­
centage (77 percent) of relational modes are ->•, and 62 
percent of the interaction is equivalent symmetry. A 
preponderance of mutual definitions of equality is not 
surprising in a consciousness-raising group. The ex­
pressed purpose of consciousness-raising groups is to 
make the group members aware of their experiences as 
women. These experiences are then translated into 
sociological and political implications. The group 
serves as a vehicle for the creation of a supportive 
atmosphere where group members can share and interpret 
their feelings. The group discourages the establishment 
of leaders or any form of status hierarchy which may be 
detrimental to the honest expression of feelings. By 
examining specific experiences in a nonintellectualizing 
manner, the group will hopefully arrive at general con­
clusions about the experiences of women. Given this 
atmosphere, the abundant use of equivalent symmetry is 
predictable. Group members carefully avoid passing 
judgment on one another and foster a supportive environ­
ment. The process of reporting personal experiences and 
extending and elaborating the experiences of others leads 
directly to relational definitions based on equality.
The other structure-inducing cell in the first 
consciousness-raising group is the +-->■ cell. The f- act
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is a useful relational function for initiating direction. 
When a group member introduces information about herself, 
or provides closure for the comment of another, she is 
attempting a mild form of relational control. The typical 
interaction pattern in the first consciousness-raising 
group involves the initiation of control and subsequent 
acceptance and elaboration of the control attempt. The 
-»■+- cell, which would account for the shift from equivalent 
symmetry to further initiation of control and close the 
initiation, elaboration, initiation cycle ( + 
does not quite contribute to structure. However, the 
interact does exceed expected random frequency. Members 
of this consciousness-raising group define one another as 
equal and occasionally initiate relational control. Ana­
lyzing the changes over time and the dyadic .relationships 
would provide further insight into the interactional 
nature of this consciousness-raising group.
The interaction pattern in the second consciousness- 
raising group is so repetitious that it warrants little 
attention. The group enacts an overwhelming amount of 
equivalent symmetry. Over 80 percent of the relational 
definitions are equivalent and 90 percent of the utter­
ances were The coding scheme simply revealed few 
discriminations in the interaction of this group. Again, 
relationships in a consciousness-raising group which are 
based on equality are to be expected. Yet, the incredible
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proportion of equivalent symmetry in this group is pos­
sibly an indication that the category system is not 
sensitive enough to reveal variation in the interaction.
However, one difference between group one and two is 
most interesting. In the first consciousness-raising 
group, members initiated relational control (+-). In the 
second group the initiation of control occurs only rarely. 
Rather, the cell which induces structure is based on def­
erence rather than initiation (+-+-). The weak-down func­
tion is more frequent than the weak-up in this group. The 
weak-down is a relational technique for deferring to 
others. Group members seek rather than assert, thereby 
placing themselves in a passive role. Usually the 4-- is 
a result of seeking information or support for your ideas.
Deferring to another can also be a way of changing 
the topic of discussion. Group members seek the approval 
of others for their feelings and thus redirect the group. 
Rather than initiate, extend, initiate ( + --►/-»■-*-/-»■+-) like 
the decision-making groups and the first consciousness- 
raising group, members of the second consciousness-raising 
group first defer to another member and then extend. Note 
the -*•+- cycle. Similar to the other consciousness-
raising group, the -►+- only exceeds random frequency; 
however, the sequence seems to describe the relationship 
definition which is inherent in the interaction.
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Consciousness-raising groups do not utilize any form 
of competitive symmetry or complementarity. These rela­
tional forms suggest either competition or status hier­
archies which are highly incongruous with the norms and 
expectations of a consciousness-raising group. Moreover, 
the strong down (++) is almost nonexistent. Apparently 
such an obvious form of submission is a relational posi­
tion which members of a consciousness-raising group avoid.
Comparison of Decision­
Making and Consciousness- 
Raising Groups
This section first compares the decision-making 
groups to each of the consciousness-raising groups and 
discusses similarities and differences. Secondly, the 
composites of each group system are compared.
Decision-making groups with first consciousness- 
raising group. Table 2 illustrates the similarities and 
differences between the decision-making data and the 
first consciousness-raising group. Both groups utilize 
the +-, -»■+- cycle as acceptable forms of relational 
definitions. These are the most recurring interactional 
sequences in both groups and must be the relational modes 
which efficiently conduct the ’’work1' of the group. While 
mutual definitions of relational equality are often 
desirable, it isunrealistic and impractical not to expect 
group members to assert some control. Anytime a group is
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influenced by the behavior of one group member, that 
individual is asserting his inclination for relational 
control.
Recall that control in a relationship is not some­
thing to avoid. Individuals who initiate control (not 
dominance) are responsible for new ideas, information 
which challenges and increases the quality of ideas, and 
possible innovation. Moreover, while the qualitative 
nature of some relationship definitions may be similar 
for both decision-making and consciousness-raising groups, 
those relational forms can serve a variety of interperson­
al functions. A characteristic sequence of initiation, 
equality, initiation may facilitate task information 
processing in a decision-making group and self-awareness 
in a consciousness-raising group.
All cells which induce structure in the consciousness- 
raising group are also responsible for structure during 
decision making. The first consciousness-raising group 
and the decision-making group share a cyclical pattern 
in common ( + --♦-/->-*■/-»■+-). This recurring process sets 
into motion a repetitive cycle of relationship defini­
tions which "reverberate infinitely" (Raush, 1972, p. 282). 
Regardless of subject matter or goal state both groups 
must steer the group into a course of action and comment 
and elaborate before offering new direction.
An important distinguishing feature, however, is that
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the consciousness-raising group does not engage in 
conflict or competition. Competitive symmetry (+-+-) is 
not a characteristic of the first consciousness-raising 
group. If an initial t- act is not extended or supported 
( + --»■), then it will most likely meet with resistance. 
Another group member will either initiate a new idea 
immediately and subtly reject the preceding one, or 
disagree with the original comment outright.
This type of interaction is highly compatible with 
the requirements of each group. Consciousness-raising 
groups avoid passing judgment, prescribing behavior or 
disconfirming the experiences of another. Competitive 
symmetry is exactly the form of interaction members of a 
consciousness-raising group want not only to avoid but 
eliminate. In decision-making groups, on the other hand, 
competitive symmetry can function as substantive conflict 
which is crucial for idea testing. Moreover, since dif­
ferentiation and some form of role specialization often 
facilitates work, competitive symmetry suggests members 
who are contending for influence.
Decision-making groups with second consciousness- 
raising group. The decision-making groups interface with 
the second consciousness-raising group in a different 
manner. The second consciousness-raising group utilizes 
seeking rather than asserting behavior. The most
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recurring cycle in this group is + -»■+-. The
decision-making groups employ this cycle though not as 
often as the initiation cycle. The and -H- interacts 
are used half as often (12 percent vs. 25 percent) as the 
+ --*• and -H-- interacts. It is possible that 4-- sequences 
symbolize broader areas of discussion in decision-making 
groups. In other words, group members seek permission 
(+-) to consider some issue. The group then sets into 
motion the initiation cycle ( + -->/■>-»■/-»■+-) which is more 
conducive to providing information and discussing the issue. 
People defer to others in decision-making situations to 
acquire some form of information and subsequently enter 
into discussion about the information. The second 
consciousness-raising group uses the +- cycle exclusively. 
Group members simply defer to others before extending and 
do not initiate relational control. The differential use 
of these cycles of interaction are certainly what account 
for the significant differences between the two 
consciousness-raising groups.
The second consciousness-raising group does not 
share competitive symmetry or initiation (+-) with the 
decision-making groups. Recall competitive symmetry is 
probably a highly undesirable mode of interaction for 
consciousness-raising groups. And this particular group 
continuously avoids initiating relational control. Unlike 
the first consciousness-raising group, this group uniformly
avoids the use of authority and control as forms of 
relational definition.
Comparison of both group systems. The two 
consciousness-raising groups cannot justifiably be com­
bined and compared to the decision-making groups. However, 
for heuristic reasons some discussion of the two group 
systems might prove insightful. When the two sets of data 
were compared directly, the differences were considerable. 
And Table 4 reports those functions which differ between 
the two groups. The concept of group tensity may help 
illuminate the differences between the two groups (see 
Werbel, Ellis, and Fisher, 1974).
Any collection of people legitimately called a group 
exist because of some tension or disparity between the 
state of the group and the state of the environment.
Tensity refers to the relationship between the group system 
and the immediately environing system. The manner in 
which a group operates upon or transacts with its envir­
onment is termed tensity. There are important theoretical 
implications of tensity for communication. Groups relate 
to their environment differentially, and the only way a 
group system accomplishes this is through some communica­
tive exchange. Therefore, it is interaction which becomes 
the defining characteristic of groups. For example, 
decision-making groups are "extensive.” That is, they
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reach out to create, manipulate, and organize information 
from their environment. Decision-making groups require a 
free exchange (open system) with their external environ­
ment because their goals are predicated upon altering 
the environment in some desired manner. Members of a 
decision-making group must readily obtain, test, and 
process information. A consciousness-raising group is 
an "intensive" group. Intensive groups turn away from 
the external environment. Group members turn toward one 
another and try to eliminate influences from the outside. 
Interaction in the intensive group is designed to serve 
the individual and is primarily a closed system.
Tensity partially explains the differences between 
the two group systems. Decision-making groups employ a 
greater variety of interaction and utilize those rela­
tional modes which are most useful for extracting and 
processing information from the environment. Except for 
the strong down (++) the two groups differ from one 
another in every way. The up function, by definition, 
indicates that group members have used some outside 
source of information in an effort to control the envir­
onment. The decision-making groups employ tfunctions 25 
percent of the time as opposed to nine percent in the 
consciousness-raising groups. And the weak-up which is 
a more acceptable form of control and highly valuable 
for information processing occurs four times as often
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in decision-making groups.
The weak-down mode, while of secondary importance 
in the decision-making groups, still occurs with twice 
the frequency than in consciousness-raising groups. 
Consciousness-raising groups avoid differences, conflict, 
and judgmental statements. Consistent with the expecta­
tions of intensive groups, they enact their own environ­
ment which is divorced from external influence. And 
equivalent symmetry is the form of relational interaction 
most capable of ensuring a minimum of outside influence. 
Except for the all states in the consciousness-raising 
groups which differ significantly from the decision­
making groups occur with less frequency.
These two groups operate in accordance with tensity 
expectations. Of course, most groups can be classified 
by more than one tensity class. Both extensive and in­
tensive groups often utilize relational functions which 
are characteristic of the other; however, how the inter­
action is organized is most important. Though 
consciousness-raising groups use initiation cycles, they 
are secondary in importance to equivalent symmetry. And 
while equivalent symmetry is most probable in decision­
making groups it is not nearly as persistent in decision­
making groups as-in consciousness-raising groups. More­
over, the impact of initiation and control sequences 




This section examines the interaction as it changes 
over time. Most literature posits either three or four- 
phase sequences. Therefore, these groups were divided 
into both thirds and fourths. The following section dis­
cusses relational definitions as they progress through 
time .
Decision-making groups. Whether the data were 
divided into thirds or fourths, the decision-making 
groups exhibited significant change over time. Only two 
states account for the variation when the data were 
divided into three time periods. However, four states 
break out when divided into four time periods. The time 
series analysis enhances specificity because certain 
interaction which is nonsignificant in the total inter­
action is important in specific time periods.
The transitions from the 4-- row differ in phase 
three from the composite. The cells or specific inter­
acts which are most disparate from the composite are the 
4--f- and 4--•> cells (see Table 7). The +- + - cell is less 
probable in phase three than in the composite and the 4---> 
interact is more probable. Also, the 4-- function is more 
frequent during the third time period than any other time 
period. Recall that the down function is a form of
8 0
yielding or conformity. During the end of the decision­
making process group members are essentially finished 
arguing over issues. Members are aware of the issues and 
have been debating them for some time. Hence few comments 
initiate new ideas. The infrequent occurrence of + - func­
tions in phase three corroborates this. Disfavor and 
confusion must be transformed into favorable decision 
making in this time period. As group members come to 
agreement on key issues and begin to finalize conclusions, 
they seek the assistance of others. Therefore the +--*■ 
is more functional late in the decision-making process.
The ■+■ function is the second state which contributes 
to significant variation in the data. And it is signifi­
cant across all three time periods. During the first 
phase the -»•+- and -»-»• interacts are most different from 
the composite. Increases in +- early in the interaction 
is consistent with some of the literature on phasic devel­
opment. Group members have entered a new social climate 
and during their attempts to orient and define the situa­
tion members test and contend for control. Group members 
are making bold statements and trying to direct the 
interaction. A decrease in equivalent symmetry is con­
sistent with this trend.
The second phase marks an abrupt increase in equiva­
lent symmetry and decrease in + - statements. There are 
still instances of initiation, but the group resorts to
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prolonged extension of issues. In phase one numerous 
decision proposals come under consideration. However, 
the group now focuses on more specific issues and spends 
more time discussing and supporting these issues. Ellis 
(1976) also noted an increase in equivalent symmetry 
during the middle time period. Such a relational defini­
tion may be a style of cooperation and conducive to gener­
ating information for the groups eventual use. Equivalent 
symmetry is a comfortable form of relational interaction 
and varies inversely with messages asserting control.
The most noteworthy aspect of the final phase is the 
drop in f- comments. Group members avoid asserting control 
in the final phase and maintain a reinforcing atmosphere. 
Consistent with a decline in control is the increased use 
of one-down functions. The weak-down state is significant 
in phase three because of a marked increase in frequency. 
All other states operate at approximately their equilibrial 
level. The only cell which varies to any degree from the 
composite transition probability is the cell. All 
others have marginal differences. The final phase of 
decision making is characterized by a dissipation of 
dissent. Though one might expect an increase in equiva­
lent symmetry, this does not occur because most of the 
functions combine with (see Table 8) to form a 
interact. Group members are simply seeking and receiving 
support for the accomplished work.
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The three-phase division of the data is not as 
enlightening as the four-phase division. When divided 
into fourths twice as many states account for variation. 
Three phases seem to overlap finer distinctions and 
spuriously conceal sources of variation. The ensuing 
description of four phases of decision-making highlights 
the importance of a greater variety of interaction 
sequences and, for the most part, supports previous 
research.
The first fourth of the data is compatible with the 
first third. The only state which varies significantly 
is the -*■ state. The •* state functions almost autonomously 
in these data. When equivalent symmetry is at an equil- 
ibrial level, the system appears to maintain a homeostatic 
balance. Significant variation results when interactants 
either increase or decrease their use of the -»■ function.
The -»■ seems to be the norm, and only when members deviate 
from the norm does the interaction vary over time. More­
over, since most relational definitions are either 
or 4-- a departure from + usually constrains the transition 
probabilities of either +- or + This is especially true 
in the first phase. Equivalent symmetry is less probable 
and initiation is more probable. Interactants immediately 
compete for control. This finding is supported by Fisher’s 
(1970) four-phase model of decision making. Fisher dis­
covered that group members search for ideas and direction,
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and that there are fewer favorable comments in the begin­
ning moments of interaction. If this is true, an increase 
in initiation functions ( + -) and a decrease in supportive 
functions (-►) is expected. During time of developing 
social climate and ambiguous relationships group members 
contend for authority and hesitate to reinforce the 
authority efforts of others.
Ellis and Fisher (1975) argue that conflict in the 
first moments of decision making stems from individual 
differences rather than group-generated information.
Though competitive symmetry (+-+-) does not vary signifi­
cantly, the first phase contains more than any other 
except phase two. The + - function plays a very important 
role in phase one. Group members assert their relational 
control as a ploy to test and clarify their relationships 
with other members. If early interaction is characterized 
by individual rather than group generated issues, a 
dominance of +- is an expected form of interaction.
The second phase helps clarify the first phase.
Again, the -*• state is the only significant state in phase 
two. However, there is a further increase in ■++- and -»-»• 
interacts. The -*•+- interact is more probable in phase two 
than any other. If members cautiously explore their rela­
tionships with others in the first phase, they expand 
this exploration in the second phase. But the second 
phase exhibits more control attempts and more competitive
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symmetry than any other phase. Apparently, group members 
are challenging the ideas of others and beginning to take 
the group-generated subject matter to task.
The probability of equivalent symmetry or supportive 
extension increases from phase one to phase two. In 
addition to the initiation of more relational control, 
group members begin to support certain individuals. The 
research by Tuckman (1965) and Fisher (1970) would predict 
that the second phase of group interaction be a conflict 
phase. Though these data do not clearly support such a 
prediction, the trends in relationship definitions seem 
consistent.
The third phase of the interaction is the most inter­
esting. All states except f+ contribute to significant 
change over time. The essence of the third phase is the 
dissipation of relational control. Group members tenta­
tively asserted relational control in phase one and con­
tested it in phase two. In the third phase this is no 
longer a consideration. The frequency and transition 
probability of +- comments decline. Equivalent symmetry 
increases substantially in phase three which indicates 
prolonged extension and relational definitions of equality 
which promote decision making. Group members have resolved 
their relational conflicts over how they will organize 
and begin the task of processing information about specif­
ic issues. Equivalent symmetry may be the most expeditious
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manner of accomplishing this. Relationships based on 
equality provide the flexibility and tolerance required 
for serious discussion of an issue.
The ++ state is difficult to interpret and hence not 
very meaningful. The ++++ cell probabilities are mis­
leading. The composite data only contains five instances 
of 4-+++ interacts which comprises only .0009 percent of 
the interaction. Even though all five occur in phase 
three and increase the transition probability, there is 
far too little data to justify any conclusions. The same 
is true for the 4- + + + interact. The + +-»■ has a lower tran­
sition probability then expected because those interacts 
which went from ++ to i+ or ++ were drawn from ■*. These 
interaction sequences may certainly be a hint of some 
important occurrence in phase three, but these data simply 
require further research. The +- is beginning to appear 
in phase three. Group members are more supportive of one 
another and less hesitant to seek relevant information.
The +- state is more important, however, in phase four.
The final phase of the decision-making process is 
distinguished by the 4-- and -* states. Contrary to intui­
tive and empirical expectations, equivalent symmetry is 
not at its peak during the final, phase of decision making. 
Initiation of relational control is, however, at a low. 
Assertion of control is no longer important in the final 
phase. Disagreement of any sort has probably vanished
86
and + - comments are less functional to the interaction 
system. The +- state is the key to understanding the 
last phase of decision making. The last phase accommo­
dates the greatest proportion of +- functions and util­
izes a +- , -H- exchange. Personal rather than ideologi­
cal support is an infrequent form of content interaction. 
Yet, personal support may be accounting for the increased 
use of +- functions in the final phase. Group members may 
be expressing personal support for one another as they 
complete their task. This finding is consistent with 
' Fisher’s (1970) reinforcement phase.
Consciousness-raising groups. Each of the 
consciousness-raising groups \vas divided into both thirds 
and fourths. The second consciousness-raising group was 
not significant in either division of the data. The 
parameters of the interaction, then, were stationary 
and reflecting no sequences of interaction attributable 
to a specific time period. The overwhelming use of equi­
valent symmetry surely accounts for this finding. Group 
members have established equivalent symmetry as the norma­
tive relationship definition and employ no other type of 
relational interaction to a significant degree. An exam­
ination of larger portions of the group’s history may have 
yielded significant variation over time. The first 
consciousness-raising group was also nonsignificant when
the data were divided into thirds. However, the group 
did yield a significant four-phase pattern.
The first phase of group one produces an increase 
in the probability of competitive symmetry. The transi­
tion probability from + - to +- in phase one substantially 
exceeds the composite probability. Even the infrequent 
++ is most probable in the first phase. This conclusion 
is interesting because relational control is an unusual 
form of interaction in a consciousness-raising group.
Recall that this group generated a -*+- initiation
cycle. Apparently this cycle is characteristic of early 
interaction. Similar to the decision-making groups, 
then, members of a consciousness-raising group assert 
their authority. Women who engage in a consciousness- 
raising experience for the first time need structure. Not 
until later in the group's history do they become com­
fortable with the norm of equality. The high probability 
of competitive symmetry in phase one is an indication 
that those who seek relational control are being c h a l ­
lenged. Members of decision-making groups exhibit early 
challenges of authority, but not as abruptly as 
consciousness-raising groups. Members may not yet be 
acquainted with the imposed constraints of a consciousness- 
raising experience.
The second phase reflects no significantly varying 
interaction. Phases one, three, and four account for the
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overall significance. Phase two is typical of composite 
interaction. Equivalent symmetry is highly redundant 
and there are occasional transitions to +- but less than 
in phase one.
Phase three is characterized by an increase in 
equivalent symmetry (see Table 17). Equivalent symmetry 
is a highly predictable type of interaction in a 
consciousness-raising group. But in the third time period 
it is even more predominant. No other interact exceeds 
its expected transition probability. Given the advent of 
a the probability of a transition to another -»■ is very 
high (.90). As group members take turns sharing and dis­
cussing their feelings they enact equal relationships.
The essence of the group experience is the interaction in 
the third phase. Eastman (19 73) writes that women in 
consciousness-raising groups learn that in order to decide 
and control their behavior they are dependent on their 
interactions with others. And that the women require 
confirmation and the acceptance of their identity. The 
equivalent symmetry in phase three is how women accomplish 
this. Continuous patterns of relational equality allow 
for implicit and explicit confirmation of personal ex­
periences. By internalizing the norms of the group, 
women group members can intertwine their identities with 
the group identity.
The last phase prompts another decrease in equivalent
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symmetry and slight increase in + -. Eastman (1973) in 
her participant observation study discovered that quite 
often group members had to deal with challenges and dis­
putes from others. The trends in these data support such 
a conclusion. As the group develops, members are pos­
sibly less concerned about infringing on personal mat­
ters. Issues which were either dropped or avoided 
earlier are later confronted. Over time the group de­
velops the spirit of unit and allows for a greater vari­
ety of interaction.
Nature of Dyadic 
Relationships
The homogeneity measure was used to test whether 
specific dyads had interaction patterns different from the 
composite interaction. Interestingly enough, neither 
consciousness-raising group had a statistically signifi­
cant dyadic relationship. Based on the analysis presented 
above this is not surprising. The data generated by 
these consciousness-raising groups are very predictable 
and consistent over time. For the most part, the param­
eters of the interaction were stationary. The lack of 
statistical significance indicates that all group members 
related to one another similarly. The decision-making 
groups, however, display in intriguing pattern of signifi­
cant relationships. This final section is devoted to the 
significant dyads in the decision-making groups.
Group one. Speaker one of the first decision-making 
group has a significant relationship with every other 
member of the group when he is the subsequent speaker.
And as the antecedent speaker, speaker one forms a sig­
nificant relationship with speakers two and five. Table 
20 reports all the interacts which induce structure in the 
matrices generated by the significant dyads. For ex­
ample, the matrix generated by dyad 1-2 (one as antece­
dent speaker and two as subsequent), has five cells which 
induce structure (+->-/+ -->/!--»-/ + - + /4-- + -), and three which 
exceed random frequency -(-*■+-/■*■+ -/ + - + -). When these inter­
acts are compared to the composite interacts (last column 
of Table 20) the functions which are unique to the dyadic 
relationship and accounting for significance become evident.
When the group completed its task each member was 
asked to identify their perceived leader. In group one, 
every member identified speaker one as the leader.
While the dyads formed with the group leader differ from 
the composite interaction, the differences are not of a 
single type. That is, the leader’s relational interaction 
is different with every other member of the group. The 
leader does not "do" one thing which sets him apart from 
all other group members. Apparently, the leader takes 
stock of the individuals in the group and enacts behaviors 
he considers appropriate for each individual.
Speakers one and two form a reciprocal complementary
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relationship. Reciprocity, according to Bateson (1935) , 
obtains when both parties in a relationship are capable 
of interchangeable behaviors. Though person A enacts 
behavior X and B responds with Y, B is also capable of 
enacting X and having A respond with Y. The two inter­
acts which distinguish dyads 1-2 and 2-1 are +-+- and
However, both dyads 1-2 and 2-1 enact a +-t- rela­
tionship. The two group members interchange their be­
haviors. At one time the leader will defer to the 
authority of member two, and speaker two later defers to 
the leader. The leader frequently enacts a +-.
An intuitive impression from listening to the inter­
action suggests that the leader asks many questions, and 
questions transform into +-. This is how the leader 
directs the interaction. Rather than instructing someone, 
the leader suggests a course of action in the form of a 
question. Also, after a group member offers an opinion 
the leader often responds with a question such as "What 
do you think about that," or "Does anyone else have any­
thing to add." Member two is the only other group member 
who regularly challenges the leader. Often when the 
leader asserts relational authority, member two chal­
lenges the authority ( + -+-), However, the leader main­
tains the authoritive role because member two ultimately 
responds to leader control with deference.
The reciprocity between the leader and member two
indicates a balanced relationship. Both members defer 
to the other when appropriate, but neither will hesitate 
to challenge. Such reciprocal relations are probably 
useful to the successful leader. It allows him to draw 
upon the expertise of others and still maintain a healthy 
interpersonal atmosphere. Cattell (1951) argued that any 
behavior which assisted the group in achieving desired 
results was leadership behavior. And any member of a 
group could display these behaviors in varying degrees.
This leader produced a variety of behaviors which fit 
those around him. Moreover, in addition to interaction 
consistent with composite expectations, all other dyadic 
relationships formed with the leader have distinguishing 
characteristics.
The interaction which characterizes members one and 
five (1-5, 5-1) is a ++->• cycle, with the leader in the 
dominant position. The only blatant dominance is initiated 
by the leader and supported by member five. Member five 
does not challenge the leader at any time, and is defin­
itely submissive to the leader. Each time the leader 
seriously disagrees or disconfirms someone, he is sup­
ported by member five. Furthermore, note that competi­
tive symmetry with the leader producing the first +- is 
nonexistent in dyad 1-5. Member five does not challenge 
the leaders authority. However, when member five initiates 
control he is challenged by the leader. This individual
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is not a strong force in the interaction and relates to 
the leader in a conventional manner. He supports the 
leader's authority and is not rewarded when he attempts to 
initiate control.
The leader forms significant relationships with 
members three and four only as the antecedent speaker.
All the interaction in the 3-1 dyad is consistent with 
expectations except for a lack of competitive symmetry 
and the addition of complementarity. The leader
interchanged behaviors with member two and dominated 
member five. And now the leader is deferent to member 
three. It is possible that member three made signifi­
cant ideological contributions to the group, or at least 
his ideas were not challenged. The lack of expected com­
petitive symmetry is the strongest argument in support of 
this position. When member three initiates relational 
control he is not challenged. The leader either supports 
or defers to member three. If the leader's deference is 
in the form of a question, then the leader must be spend­
ing time seeking information from member three.
Again the leader is discriminating about how he 
responds to others. Group members who express potentially 
instrumental ideas are rewarded or utilized by the leader. 
Such behavior is highly functional. The leader guides 
group progress and facilitates outcomes not by exerting 
final authority but by knowing when and how to draw the
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contributions of others into the interaction.
The 4-1 dyad is interesting because of how they do 
not interact. There is no competitive symmetry or leader 
support of speaker four deference. These two individuals 
probably pay little attention to one another. Member four 
initiates an expected amount of relational control and is 
reinforced rather than challenged. Similar to the 3-1 
dyad, the leader does not see fit to disagree with the 
control initiations of member four. The 4-1 dyad is much 
more casual than the others. The lack of competitive 
symmetry, dominance, and submission indicate that these 
two group members disperse their behavior across a variety 
of functions. The leader simply did not invest consider­
able time in member four. All other group members inter­
act uniquely with the leader and thereby contribute to 
one or more fo the numerous verbal functions required for 
decision making. The leader avoids relational contention 
probably because member four is not considered a signifi­
cant force in the group.
In short, dyadic relationships formed with the leader 
of group one are unique. The leader enacts and inter­
structures special behaviors with each group member. The 
leader challenges and is challenged. He defers at one 
moment, dominates at another and sometimes ignores. A 
more complete explanation of these data should argue that 
all group members perform leadership behaviors. When
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forced to identify the group leader, members can point 
to an individual. However, it is still probably true 
that this individual is not "the leader" of the group.
Yet one certainly cannot deny that dyads formed with 
the identified leader are distinctive. But these dyads 
are distinctive not because the leader behaves in a single 
and consistent manner, but because he responds to others 
with greater frequency and variety. Table 20 indicates 
that the leader as respondent rather than initiator is 
more important. If all group members perform important 
verbal functions, then the leader is possibly most viable 
as a reactor. The leader may direct the group through the 
adept use of various responsive behaviors rather than 
patent structuring.
Group two. The second decision-making group also 
displays a neat pattern of significant dyadic relation­
ships with one person. However, the one individual is 
not the perceived group leader. The second decision­
making group does not exhibit the same leadership inter­
action as the first group. However, when members of 
group two were asked to identify their leader only three 
of the four members named the same person. Though this 
one deviation is slight, it does indicate some wayward 
perceptions.
Speaker two, who forms the significant relationship
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with other group members, was perceived as a deviant by 
the rest of the group. However, member two was labeled 
an opinion deviate rather than a role deviant (see Samp­
son and Brandon, 1964). A role deviate is someone whose 
entire personality is antithetical to the group. He is 
not liked by the group and usually ignored by other mem­
bers. An opinion deviate is someone whose ideas differ 
from the group. This individual is often valuable and 
the group expends considerable energy interacting with 
the opinion deviate. Group members wrote that member 
two had expressed opinions, was vociferous, and often 
went off on a tangent. In group two, then, the opinion 
deviate formed significant relationships with all group 
members.
The person the three group members perceived to be 
the leader was member one. And member one enters into a 
significant relationship with the opinion deviate (member 
two) when he is both antecedent and subsequent speaker. 
Member one, if he may be considered a leader, responds to 
the opinion more than anyone else. Unlike the 1-2 and 2-3 
dyads, member one engages in competitive symmetry with 
the opinion deviate. He challenges member two. Yet the 
distinguishing interaction in the 2-1 dyad is +-+- com­
plementarity. In other dyads deference by member two 
either does not exist or is extended. But the leader 
attempts to control the opinion deviate. Speaker one
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might feel threatened by the attitudes of member two.
When member two defers, the leader does not hesitate to 
assume the control position. However, when member one 
initiates (column 1 -2) the opinion deviate shies away. 
Member two only supports control attempts by the leader 
and does not challenge.
The opinion deviate may be a creative force in the 
group, but his relationship with the supposed group 
leader is restraining. Members one and two do most of 
the talking in the group and enact the greatest variety 
of behaviors. It is entirely possible that many of the 
opinion deviate's behaviors are leadership behaviors.
Most of the group work occurs between members one and 
two with the other group members assuming more passive 
roles. The other dyadic relationships support this con­
tention.
Member two does not enter into conflict with member 
three. The absence of competitive symmetry is the dis­
tinguishing feature of the 2-3 dyad. When the opinion 
deviate exerts relational control, he is supported by 
member three. The 2-4 dyad also illustrates control by 
the opinion deviate. Member four at least contends with­
in expectations, but ultimately defers. Though no data 
support this hypothesis, it is possible that the competi­
tive symmetry between the 2-4 dyad occurred early. After 
repeated failure member four finally assumes the submissive
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position in the relationship. Member two does not defer 
to member four and is usually reinforced by him. The 
data are not conclusive, but everyone except for the 
possible leader enters into compliant relationships with 
the opinion deviate. His continuous efforts to direct 
the group process are challenged by the leader and ac­
cepted by others.
The one significant dyad (4-3) which does not include 
member two tends to support the argument that members 
three and four cooperate and defer to others easily.
Dyad 4-3 produced the fewest units of interaction (60 
percent fewer than dyads 1-2, 2-1, and 2-3) which means 
they participated less and listened more. Moreover, dyad 
4-3 has the highest percentage of equivalent symmetry 
(53 percent) when compared to the other significant dyads. 
And many of their interacts barely exceed random frequency.
Reciprocal complementarity is their characteristic 
mode of interaction. When member four initiates control 
member three takes the cue and defers. And when four 
goes down, three goes up. These easily interchangeable 
behaviors indicate cooperation. Members one and two 
control most of the interaction and three and four assist. 
The sheer frequency and intensity of the 1-2 and 2-1 
dyads must be overwhelming. Members three and four 
respond only to the relational attempts of the opinion 




Interacts Inducing Structure 
in Dyad 4-3
4-3 Composite





*Cells exceed RF only
two. And their relationship with member two is one of 
deference and cooperation.
Briefly the opinion deviate is a significant force 
in group two. A distinction between leadership behaviors 
and many of the beahviors elicited by the opinion deviate 
is probably not very useful. Both individuals make 
significant contributions to the group. Member one may 
have been perceived as the leader because he faced and 
challenged the difficulties prompted by the opinion de­
viate. Or member one may have assumed responsibility for 
procedural matters which many group members view as leader­
ship duties. In any case, the perceived leader and 
opinion deviate interstructure their behaviors to promote 
group progress.
Fisher and Valentine (1974) developed a principle of 
Merton's (1957) to explain deviance in the process of 
interaction. Merton's category of innovative deviance 
implies that a group member may support the goals and 
ambitions of the group, but not the means for attaining 
these goals. By deviating from the group norms, the 
innovative deviant enriches the group’s available stock 
of ideas. Interrogating and probing others allow for 
important tests of ideas. The behavior of member two is 
consistent with predictions derived from verbal innovative 
deviance. Most of the group interaction involves member 
two, and he engages in considerable disagreement. Future
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research should endeavor to refine the concepts of lead­
ership and opinion deviance. The prescribed leader who 
skillfully and successfully guides a group is, in a sense, 
a deviant. And the opinion deviate who challenges and 
resists also leads.
Recommendations
First, I want to reiterate the descriptive nature 
of this study. Specifically, all conclusions based on 
those data which induce structure in a matrix or compare 
one transition probability to another must be tempered by 
the limitations of the procedure. The argument that an 
interact which occurs with a frequency and transition 
probability greater than random expectation, contributes 
to structure or predictability in the data is certainly 
sound. However, it is difficult to determine "how much" 
structure a particular interact induces. Some conclusions 
about predictable interaction are based on cells which 
barely surpass random expectations. While others are 
drawn from highly frequent and probable data.
The tables which compare state transition probabili­
ties in a specific time period to a composite transition 
probability are especially troublesome. Whether the word 
"significant” is used statistically or pragmatically, the 
question remains, how much of a deviation is a "significant” 
deviation. Future research might consider using chi square
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or logarithmic transformations where the shape of the 
distribution is known. Though either procedure is often 
subject to debate, they might provide a useful decision­
making tool for determining cell differences. Neverthe­
less, these findings are interesting and certainly sug­
gest further research. The following discussion of 
proposed changes in the category system should provide 
guidelines for future research.
First, the category system requires reconceptualiza­
tion. The + and - codes should remain but rather than 
considering them as merely measures of intensity, they 
should be reconceptualized as contributing qualitatively 
different functions. The ++, for example, is an obvious 
instance of dominance. When an iteractant attempts to 
severely restrict the options open to a respondent, he 
seeks to dominate the other individual. Imperatives, 
questions demanding justification, and personal nonsupport 
are efforts to dictatorially control the behavior of 
another.
In contrast to ++, the +- offers relational control 
but provides for a variety of responses. The +- function 
is best considered as an initiation or an influence at­
tempt which is qualitatively different from dominance.
The distinction between ++ and +- is not accurately one 
of mere intensity. Rather, the f+ function seeks to gain 
mastery over another, while the is a socially acceptable
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form of management. Dominance often, but not necessarily, 
implies negative affect. Initiation, on the other hand, 
is highly characteristic of normal interaction and occurs 
so regularly that interactants are often unaware of it as 
relational control.
An important reconceptualization involves the -*• cate­
gory and specifically its transformation rules. Other 
researchers transformed ideational support into a 4- func­
tion. But this study considered simple support as an 
attempt by the speaker to associate himself with a desir­
able position. One speaker was telling another that he 
agreed with his idea and wanted to share in its worthi­
ness. Therefore, simple ideational support was transformed 
into a Upon reconsideration, however, simple support 
is probably not clearly a -v functions. The -»■ function 
should be comprised of those relational definitions which 
do not promote any differences between the interactants. 
Extension and elaboration symbolize efforts to avoid 
control by one individual and should preserve the sole 
functioning of
Ideational support should return to a down code, but 
in this revised coding scheme support would become a + -.
The +- is then considered deference but not submission.
When one speaker supports another, he is dependent upon 
the previous speaker for the initiation of the idea. And 
the subsequent speaker is admitting his respect for the
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idea--not submission to the person. An interactant holds 
a deferential position in a relationship when he ac­
knowledges the control attempt of another person. This 
reconceptualization will allovr for complementarity in the 
form of initiation and support (+-+-).
Finally, the + + remains submission. Extended support 
of another individual implies submission to the will of 
that individual. When a speaker submits, he admits to a 
lack of power in the relationship.
Changes in how certain categories are transformed 
are necessary to accommodate the proposed suggestions.
The "extended" categories along the personal dimension 
(categories 5 and 9) could easily be eliminated. Personal 
support of any kind would then be submissive (4- + ) , and 
personal nonsupport would become a f+. Support or non­
support at the personal rather than ideological level is 
always acute, and the distinction between simple and 
extended is not particularly helpful. Therefore, the 14 
code would be transformed to ++ and the 18 code to t+. 
Because of the grammatical format, code 24 should also 
become a ++.
Redefining the relational implications of simple 
ideational support necessitates a transformation change 
for 16. For the reasons outlined above, code 16 must be 
transformed Moreover, 26 should change to a ++. When
an interactant commands support for another he seeks to
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dominate the interaction.
These proposed changes should also serve to allevi­
ate the persistent occurrence of equivalent symmetry and 
reveal a greater variety of relational modes. As Rosen 
(1972) asserts, an analytical system should be "function 
perserving." That is, a category system should disting­
uish among the various communicative functions operating 
in a system. The amount of structure in a system is less 
important than the qualitative nature of the structure.
By reconceptualizing the category scheme, future data 
should reflect these differences.
A first priority for future research is a replication 
study using the proposed category changes. If equivalent 
symmetry is so prevalent in decision-making and 
consciousness-raising groups, more research is required to 
validate and clarify this finding. Future data should 
include decision-making groups other than classroom groups. 
Replications might take into account varying levels of 
motivation, commitment, prior role structure, or status 
as possible determinants of relational interaction.
Consciousness-raising groups should be examined more 
completely. Consciousness-raising groups are unique ex­
periences. However, some relational functions may be 
unique to consciousness-raising groups. Other groups may 
not experience the extreme equivalent symmetry these did. 
The consciousness-raising group experience is especially
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important to the private lives of its members, A long 
term study examining the complete evolution of 
consciousness-raising groups is essential. Little is 
known about the long term effects of these groups. How 
do women become socialized? What sort of interpersonal 
conflicts must group members encounter and overcome? 
Communication is the essence of a consciousness-raising 
group, and the observation of interaction patterns should 
yield important results.
Furthermore, relational interaction should have 
tremendous implications for validating group tensity.
Groups are self-regulating systems which often defy a 
priori categorization. If how people "relate” to one 
another is the defining characteristic of a group, then 
varying types of relational interaction should correlate 
with tensity classes. There may be structural similari­
ties across groups but the interaction may function variably 
according to situational constraints.
Leadership is an important concept which has signifi­
cant implications for group interaction. The conclusions 
drawn from this study uphold the functional perspective 
of leadership. Leadership should reflect a process of 
interpersonal influence in the group, and not necessarily 
a structural position in a network or a personal charac­
teristic of an individual. As a system, a group is char­
acterized by equifinality or the ability to reach a final
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state from different initial conditions. As a model of 
adaptability, the concept of equifinality implies a 
finite set of behavioral choices, present in the here and 
now, which facilitate goal attainment. Leadership, then, 
exists iji the interaction and is the result of the con­
tinuous process of trial and error. The system ultimately 
settles at a point where there is no longer conflict with 
the environment.
The findings in this study suggest further examina­
tion of adaptable leadership functions. The important 
research questions become "how” do leaders interstructure 
their behaviors with others to satisfy group requirements. 
For example, if a group is threatened by conflict, how do 
leaders mediate the conflict? What relational functions 
do leaders use to stimulate critical evaluation of ideas? 
If several people perform leadership functions, how do 
these individuals organize their behaviors? What rela­
tional definitions determine who will lead or when an 
individual will take the initiative? These questions are 
best answered by observing member relationships rather 
than individual characteristics.
If the process of interaction is the dependent 
variable, then experimental procedures should prove use­
ful. By manipulating task, compositional, and environ­
mental variables and then allowing a group to proceed 
naturally under the constraints of these manipulations,
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researchers can observe the developing patterns of inter­
action which facilitate group success. These research 
programs may lead to eventual conclusions about what 
constitutes a good or successful leader.
Returning to Lewin's (1943) observation about member 
interdependence as the crucial element of a group, atten­
tion is easily directed to the diversity of perspectives 
on human relationships. People interact with family, 
friends, enemies, coworkers, subordinates, and colleagues; 
but these interactional settings say little about how 
specific verbal behavior is manifested in our relation­
ships with others. The most important aspect of this study 
is probably its emphasis on the process of communication. 
Individuals take stock of one another and interstructure 
their behaviors. By focusing on these interactional pro­





This category system attempts to measure relational 
interaction. Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967) posit 
two axioms about the content and relationship levels of 
communication, and complementary and symmetrical interac­
tion. Consistent with these two axioms, the category 
system is designed to transform verbal content into rela­
tional definitions. After identifying a speaker, the 
category system codes the unit of analysis into grammati­
cal format and how the unit relates to the previous com­
ment. Based on this coding, each unit of analysis is 
transformed into an "up” (+), a "down" (i), or an across 
(-►) . These codings refer to attempts at either relational 
authority, submission, or equality, respectively.
Example:
Person A 31 "Where did you find that information?"
Person B 11 "I read it in Time magazine where it
reported that the divorce rate in 
America was up 18 percent."
This interaction would be coded 31 (question seeking 
informative extension) followed by 11 (assertion providing 
information extension). According to the transformation 
rules, this interact would be a +-/+-. Seeking is a 
deferential relationship to a source of knowledge or au­
thority. The 1 -' sign is an intensity measure indicating 
that this "down"/"up" relationship is not very extreme.
Seeking justification, on the other hand, is an 
attack on the previous comment and would be a 33 coded ++. 
And when someone provides this justification of the previ­
ous comment they are also striving to maintain an + posi­
tion. This 13 is coded +. The indicates less inten­
sity in the face of a challenge to justify your position.
DIMENSION I - Identify the speaker: 1-N.
DIMENSION II - Grammatical structure of the statement;
format of the utterance.
1. Declarative a. An explicit statement with a 
Assertion referent.
b. Does not explicitly seek a 
response.
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2. Imperative a. A command or instruction.
b. Refers more to what another 
person should do, than to
114
3. Question
the opinion or attitude of 
the speaker.
c. Ex. "You must."
"It has to."
a. Interrogative in form.
b. Explicitly seeks a response.
c. Inquiry.
d. When a statement begins with 
an assertion and ends with a 
question, treat it as a ques­
tion.
Incomplete a. Initiated but not a completed 
utterance.
b. Ex. "What I meant was . . ."
"Do you mean, ah . . ."
DIMENSION III - This dimension classifies each statement











An "I don't know" comment is 
nonextended and can only fol­
low 31, 32, 33, or 34.
Continues the flow of the 
preceeding message by pro­
viding (or seeking) informa­
tion .
Either focuses or broadens by 
adding information not previ­
ously considered.
The inclusion of new informa­
tion, by definition, lowers 
the level of abstraction.
Ex. "Pollution by autos is 
really a problem."
11 "Yes, figures show that 
most cars only have one 
or two people in them."
Does not change the level of 
abstraction.
Continues the theme of the 
preceeding message.
Elaborates on the previous 
message.










e. Can repeat, clarify, restate
f. Ex. "Yea, I know what you
mean. The same thing 
happened to me last 





Provides or seeks a warrant. 
Statement of grounds or 
reasons for believing some­
thing .
Upholds or vindicates the 
previous statement.
Ex. "How is it that you can 
33 believe such a thing?"
"I think he is right 
31 because . . . "
Statement may also extend with 
information, but the purpose 
of the statement is to justify. 
The information is a warrant 
for the justification.
A simple or brief comment with 
no reason attached, which 
supports the person in the 
previous message.
Seeks or provides acceptance, 
confirmation, or approval of 
the individual.
Ex. "You really did a fine 
j o b ."
"I like the way you 
relate to people."
May contain ideational sup­
port along with explicit ref­
erence to personal support.
a. Personal support with addi­
tional information.
b. Provides a reason.




a. Supports the idea inherent in 
previous message.
b. Simple statement of approval 
for the subject matter under 
discussion.
c. Refers to ideas and data of 
various types.














a. Statement that favors or 
advocates the idea in the 
previous message.
b. Provides reasons, data, 
evidence, warrants.
c. Look for a "because" implica­
tion .
a. Disagrees with, rejects, dis- 
confirms the previous message 
at the personal level.
b. Refers to the individual,
i.e., his being, self-concept 
etc.
c. Brief or simple comment.
d. Ex. "You're all screwed up."
"You're nuts."
e. A topic change can be a p er­
sonal nonsupport when it is 
a way of relating to a 
specific response.
f. Ex. "What do you think of
my idea."
"Let's do something else
g. May contain nonsupport of 
ideational content if done in 
a manner which rejects the 
individual.
a. Same as personal support, but 
extended. Provides reasons.
b. Look for the "because" impli­
cation .
a. Disagreement, rejection of 
previous idea.
b. Relates to idea not the 
individual.
c. Ex. "I disagree."
a. Disagrees with or rejects 
previous statement but 
provides evidence, data, 
etc. for doing so.
b. Look for a "because" implica­
tion .
c. Ex. "Well, I don't see it





a. Topic change or establish­
ment of new direction.
b. Not personal disconfirmation 
if not a response to a re­
quest for response commonal­
ity .
c. Ex. "Let's consider this
issue."
d. Can be stock-taking synthesis
e. A 312 is a message which 
seeks and initiates new 
direction.
13. Other a. Nonfluencies and incompletes
b. No definition of the rela­
tionship .
c. Can only follow a four (4) 
in Dimension II.
Some Coding Hints
For any comment ask yourself whether or not the 
comment is clearly a statement of support or nonsupport.
If it is neither then you have eliminated eight (8) of 
the thirteen (13) categories. Since codes 12 (initiate 
new direction) and 13 (other) are rare and easier to 
identify, the only real decision is between categories 1 ,
2, or 3. Category 1 of Dimension II is the assertion of, 
or seeking new information. The question of new informa­
tion is important because if a comment is a restatement 
or simply more of the same information, then the comment 
is coded 2 (elaborative extension). When someone provides 
an example it is coded 1 , unless the example is a restate­
ment or a second example to clear up an earlier one.
If you decide that a comment is either support or 
nonsupport, next ask whether or not it is ideational or 
personal. After answering this question, simply decide 
if the message is simple or extended. This process of 
elimination should facilitate the coding judgment.
118
Transformation Rules
10 +- Unless follows a 33, then + 31 +-
11 +- 32 -+
12 + 33 ++
13 f + 34 + +
14 -*■ 3 5 + +
15 ++ 36 +­
16 37 + +
17 -V+ 38 t-
18 ++ 39 ++
19 + + 310 +­
110 +- 311 t+
111 +- 312 +­
112 + +
21 ++ ' 413
22  -*■
23 + +












Composite Interact Matrix for Combined
Decision-Making Groups
+-+ t - i + + - - y
21 40 6 20 125 212
.09 . 18 .02 .09 .58
47 238** 36 165 705** 1191
. 04 .21 .02 .13 .60
7 23 5 10 72 117
. 06 . 20 .04 .09 . 6 1
20 148 10 39 357** 574
. 03 .25 .01 .06 .62
117 742** 60 338* 2145** 3402
. 03 .21 . 01 .10 . 63
212 1191 117 572 3404 5496
**Fxceeds expected RF and TP
^Exceeds expected RF only
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Composite Interact Matrix for First
Consciousness-Raising Group
•f.+ +• - 4-+ 4' ~ -*■
10 6 0 11 56 83
.12 .07 .00 .13 .67
7 38 2 25 169** 241
.02 .15 .00 .10 .70
1 1 0 1 10 13
.07 .07 .00 .07 .76
4 37 0 6 82 129
.03 .28 .00 .04 .63
61 160* 11 85* 1322* 1639
.03 .09 .00 .05 .80
83 242 13 128 1639 2105
**Exceeds expected RF and TP
*Exceeds expected RF only
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Composite Interact Matrix for Second
Consciousness-Raising Group












6 10 0 7 59 82
.07 .12 .00 .08 .71
0 0 0 0 3 3
.00 .00 .00 .00 1 .0
7 9 0 11 134** 161
.04 .05 .00 .06 . 83
97 59 3 137* 2578** 2874
.03 .02 .00 .04 .89
122 82 3 160 2875 3242
**Exceeds expected RF and TP
*Exceeds expected RF only
Composite Interact Matrix for Combined
Consciousness-Raising Groups
■f.+ + - 4- + +• -
22 10 0 16 157 205
. 10 .05 .00 .08 .76
13 48 2 32 228** 323
.04 .14 .00 .10 .70
1 1 0 1 13 16
.06 .06 .00 .06 .81
11 46 0 17 216** 290
.03 .15 .00 .05 . 74
158 219* 14 223* 3903** 4517
.03 .05 .00 .05 .86
205 324 16 289 4517 5351
**Exceeds expected RF and TP
*Exceeds expected RF only
APPENDIX C
MATRICES FOR SIGNIFICANT DYADS 
FIRST DECISION-MAKING GROUP
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Interact Matrix for Dyad 1/2
++ + - + + + ~ ■+
0 3 0 2 7 12
Oo .25 . 00 .16 .58
1 12* 1 12* 37** 63
. 01 .19 .01 .19 .59
1 0 1 1 9 12
00o .00 .08 .08 .75
0 12** 1 1 19** 33
.00 .36 .03 .03 .57
4 29* 2 17* 124** 176
.02 .16 .01 .09 .70
6 56 5 33 196 296
**Exceeds RF and TP 
*Exceeds RF only
Homogeneity = 30.64; Df = 20; p < .10
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Interact Matrix for Dyad 1/5
+ + t ■ + + + ~
1 3 0 0 g * * 12
. 0 9 . 2 5 .00 o o . 66
1 5 1 5 3 7 * * 49
.02 .10 .02 .10 . 7 5
0 1 0 0 0 1
oo
• 1.0 oo oo• o o
1 0 0 1 1 7 * * 19
. 0 5
oo oo
. 0 5 . 9 0
2 20* 0 6 8 1 * * 109
.01 . 1 8 oo . 0 5 . 7 4
5 29 1 12 143 190
**Exceed RF and TP 
*Exceed RF only
Homogeneity = 34.48; df = 20; p < .05
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Interact Matrix for Dyad 2/1
+.+ + - + + + “ •+■
0 3 0 0 3 6
oo
• . 5 0 .00 .00 . 50
0 1 4 * * 2 2 3 4 * * 52
oo
. 2 6 . 0 3 . 0 3 . 6 5
0 1 0 2 2 5
oo
• .20 .00 . 4 0 . 4 0
3 11 0 1 1 6 * * 31
.10 . 3 5 .00 . 0 3 . 5 1
12* 4 9 * * 8 1 9 * 120**- 208
. 0 5 . 2 3 . 0 3 . 0 9 . 5 7
15 78 10 24 175 302
**Exceeds RF and TP 
*Exceeds RF only
Homogeneity = 30.28; df = 20; p < .10
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Interact Matrix for Dyad 3/1
+.+ t - + + + -
1 1 1 3 8 14
.07 .07 .07 .21 .57
4 10 3 13** 34** 64
.06 .15 .04 .20 .53
1 1 0 3 4 9
.11 .11 .00 .33 .44
2 5 1 0 27** 25
OOo• .20 .04 .00 .68
8 57** 3 23* 104** 195
.04 .29 . 01 .11 .53
16 74 8 42 167 307
**Exceeds RF and TP 
*Exceeds RF only
Homogeneity = 29.47; df = 20; p < .10
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Interact Matrix for Dyad 4/1
■f-+ + ~ + +"
3 2 1 0 3 9
. 3 3 .22 .11 oo . 3 3
5 7 6 8 22* * 48
.10 . 1 4 .12 . 1 6 . 4 5





1 6 0 3 8 18
. 0 5 . 3 3 • o o . 1 6 . 4 4
10 4 1 * * 4 2 3 * * m * * 189
ino .21 .02 .12 00LO•
19 57 11 34 147 268
**Exceeds RF and TP 
*Exceeds RF only
Homogeneity = 33.63; df = 20; p < .05
130
Interact Matrix for Dyad 5/1
++ + - + + + - -►
2 1 0 0 4 7
00• . 1 4 oo oo . 5 7
1 g * * 0 2 20* * 32
. 0 3 . 2 8
oo
. 0 6 . 6 2
0 2 0 0 0 2
oo 1.0 o o oo• oo
0 1 0 0 12
o o
00o oo oo . 9 2
1 3* 2 8 * * 6 1 5 * * 7 8 * * 140
. 0 9 .20 . 0 4 .10 . 5 5
16 41 6 17 113 193
**Exceeds RF and TP 
^Exceeds RF only
Homogeneity = 31.92; df = 20; p < .05
APPENDIX D
MATRICES FOR SIGNIFICANT DYADS 
SECOND DECISION-MAKING GROUP
132
Interact Matrix for Dyad 1/2
+  .+ + -  ■i' +  -f * -►
2 1 1 3 9 16
.12 .06 .06 .18 . 56
4 14 3 15 61** 97
.04 .14 .03 .15 .62
1 0 0 0 2 3
. 33 .00 .00 .00 . 66
1 6 1 4 37** 49
.02 .12 .02 .08 .75
5 40** 6 12 135** 198
.02 .20 .03 .06 .68
13 61 11 34 244 363
**Exceeds expected RF and TP 
^Exceeds expected RF only
Homogeneity = 32.65; df = 20; p < .05
133
Interact Matrix for Dyad 2/1
•f .+■ f - 4. + + -
2 1 0 3 6 12
.16 .08 .00 .25 .50
3 24** 0 10 32** 69
.04 .34 .00 .14 .46
1 4 0 0 5 10
.10 .40 .00 .00 .50
1 14** 0 1 17** 33
.03 .42 .00 .03 .51
6 53** 1 32* 115** 207
.02 .25 .00 .15 .5-5
13 96 1 46 175 331
**Exceeds expected RF and TP 
*Exceeds expected RF only
Homogeneity = 34.72; df = 20; p < .05
Interact Matrix for Dyad 2/3 




0 1 0 0 9 10
.00 .10 .00 .00 .90
3 12 1 11 68
.04 .17 .01 .16 .60
0 3 0 0 7 10
oo
• .30 .00 .00 .70
0 11 0 0 20** 31
.00 .35 .00 .00 .65
1 57** 4 15* 146** 223
oo
• .25 .01 .06 .65
4 84 5 26 223 342
**Exceeds expected RF and TP
*Exceeds expected RF only 
Homogeneity = 32.88; df = 20; p < .05
135
Interact Matrix for Dyad 2/4
+ + +- ++ +- -*■
2 2 0 1 2 7
. 2 9 . 2 9 .00 . 1 4 . 2 9
1 7 ** 2 7 * * 12* * 29
. 0 3 . 2 4 . 0 6 . 2 4 . 4 1
0 0 1 1 0 2
oo .00 . 5 0 . 5 0 .00
0 2 1 2 6 11
oo
. 1 8 . 0 9 . 1 8 . 5 5
5 20* * 2 6 6 0 * * 93
. 0 5 .21 .02 . 0 6 . 6 4
8 31 6 17 80 142
**Exceeds expected RF and TP
*Exceeds expected RF only
Homogeneity = 2 9 . 1 4 ;  df = 20 ; p < .10
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Interact Matrix for Dyad 4/3




0 2 0 0 2 4
oo
• .50 .00 .00 .50
0 5** 1 6** 5** 17
oo .29 .05 .35 .29
1 0 0 0 1 2
.50 .00 .00 .00 . 50
1 5** 0 1 5** 12
.08 .42 .00 .08 .42
0 6* 0 10* 59** 75
oo
• o 00 . 00 .13 .7-9
2 18 1 17 72 110
**Exceeds expected RF and TP
*Exceeds expected RF only 
Homogeneity = 35.14; df = 20; p < .05
APPENDIX E


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
--- 5.88 15.31 17.44 8.14 7 .45 12 .22
11 .6 6 --- 18.32 14.3 7.53 9.13 11.72
10.54 14.45 --- 13.34 17 .58 22.39 10.57
10.73 28.92 14.85 --- 18.17 5.64 18.34
4.72 7 .33 10.75 17 .17 --- 7 .88 17 .96
9.47 8 . 81 10.78 18 .12 11.83 --- 17 . 61












Homogeneity measures for all dyads in 
second consciousness-raising group
Subsequent Speaker
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 --- 11.53 17.04 13.55 17.81 9.32
2 12 .61 --- 12.79 9.65 7 .67 7.09
3 14. 5 17.05 --- 14.75 9.88 23 .75
4 18. 65 5. 51 17 .98 --- 3.67 11.13
5 11.29 15.67 4.41 9.07 --- 0 . 0
6 10.4 8.96 11.49 11.91 0 . 0 ---
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